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BANNING METAL MINING IN GUATEMALA
Raquel Aldana* and Randall S. Abate**†
Water and life are more valuable than gold.

—Roadside sign in the vicinity of San Rafael mine in Guatemala
Metal mining is unsustainable for Guatemala and its harms
insurmountable for its people. Guatemalans who oppose metal mining have
been fighting for decades domestically and internationally against the
environmental degradation and other human rights abuses from metal
mining activities in the country with little to show for their efforts. The State
is too weak and corrupt to offer much hope for reform. Guatemala requires
extensive governance reforms to become the type of strong democracy
capable of reaping the potential benefits of metal mining in its territory. This
is a long-term project. Most Guatemalans opposed to metal mining already
know this, and the struggle is largely to ban all metal mining in the country.
However, the prospect of a ban is elusive, in part because the country may
face liability from investors affected by the ban. This Article presents the best
case for a metal mining ban while exploring alternatives to minimize the
investor liability costs to the country. First, the Article recommends that
Guatemala exercise its sovereign right to adopt a law banning all future
metal mining concessions. Second, Guatemala should rely on existing
domestic laws to close the metal mines and mitigate the substantial damages
resulting from these activities. Under either approach, Guatemala is likely
to face investor liability in the millions and perhaps lose future investment in
the country. This Article offers Guatemala suggestions for defending and
mitigating these costs by relying on comparative studies of similar actions
taken by Costa Rica and El Salvador.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific. I thank Dean Francis J. Mootz and the law school for their support of this project.
The article was inspired by the 2015 Lat Crit Study Space project which took 15 scholars to Guatemala
to experience the most salient issues affecting the country, including mining. I benefitted greatly from the
exceptional research assistance of José Parra, Tania Domínguez, and Sylvia LaRosa.
** Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law and Justice, Florida Agricultural
and Mechanical University College of Law. Professor Abate gratefully acknowledges valuable research
assistance from Robin Rogers and Carolina Garcia.
† We are especially indebted to Dr. Yuri Melini of the Center for Legal Action and
Environmental Justice of Guatemala (CALAS) who has enlightened our understanding of mining in
Guatemala. We dedicate this article to Rafael Maldonado and the hundreds of environmental justice
defenders in the country who have endured so much to defend their lands, homes, and dignity. Finally,
we thank the editorial team of the Vermont Law Review who worked diligently and professionally to
improve this article.

598

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 040:597

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 598
I. METAL MINING IN CONTEXT ................................................................. 602
A. The Metal Mining Industry in Guatemala ....................................... 604
B. The Environmental, Health, Property, and Social Effects of Metal
Mining in Guatemala ............................................................................ 611
1. Environmental and Health Impacts .............................................. 611
2. Property Conflicts ........................................................................ 613
3. Social Impacts .............................................................................. 614
C. The Financial Benefits of Metal Mining: Who Profits and How
Much? .................................................................................................. 619
II. THE METAL MINING REGIME IN GUATEMALA ..................................... 624
A. The 1985 Constitution and Norms Relevant to Natural Resources . 624
B. The 1997 Mining Law ..................................................................... 626
C. Guatemala’s Environmental Laws ................................................... 633
D. Governance Gaps ............................................................................. 635
1. Water Usage and Water Quality ................................................... 635
2. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent ............................................... 636
3. Property Rights ............................................................................. 646
E. Mining Revenues and Public Spending ........................................... 646
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR GUATEMALA’S METAL MINING
PROBLEM................................................................................................... 648
A. Inadequacy of Mining Reforms in Guatemala to Date .................... 649
B. Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala: A Comparative Assessment of
Domestic Law and International Liability ............................................ 651
1. Banning Future Metal Mining ...................................................... 651
a. Nature and Scope: Costa Rica as a Model .............................. 652
b. Assessing Costs ...................................................................... 656
2. Shutting Down Current Metal Mining ......................................... 658
a. Guatemala’s Investor Rights Regime ..................................... 659
b. Closure of the Mines and Claims of Expropriation: El Salvador
and Costa Rica as Precursors .................................................. 662
c. Defending Against International Arbitration Liability ........... 665
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 669
INTRODUCTION
Metal mining is not big business in Guatemala. It generates less than one
percent of the country’s gross national product and employs less than one
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percent of the official workforce in the country.1 The metal mining industry
has also been in decline since 2012,2 and a significant subpart of the industry
will disappear completely in a matter of decades when all of the gold, silver,
and other metals have been extracted.3
For such a small industry, metal mining represents a giant problem for
Guatemala. Metal mining has generated chaos in the country and provoked
ire among many within and beyond its borders. Metal mining in Guatemala
is controversial for significant reasons. First, at an alarmingly quick pace,
metal mining is destroying much of the country’s beautiful environmental
resources.4 Second, this destruction is occurring largely without the consent
of the affected communities—both indigenous and non-indigenous.5 For
these communities, the few benefits—mostly in the form of jobs with higher
wages for some of the local residents—pale in comparison to the short-term
and long-term harms.6 In the short term, residents in metal mining
communities are disturbed by noise; sickened by contamination;
impoverished by reduced water supply and food production; divided by
conflict even among friends and family; and criminalized and physically
harmed during protests.7 In the long term, water depletion and contamination
linger, mountains and landscapes disappear, and the jobs and monies that
mines brought dissipate. The affected communities—and the entire country
as a result—are left with an even bleaker future than prior to exploitation,
literally and figuratively.
These environmental and human rights harms alone justify a rejection of
the industry in Guatemala. The disdain for metal mining, however, lies
exactly in the reasons for its presence in the country. Why is an industry that
represents such an insignificant economic investment and with such
destructive characteristics allowed to operate in the country? The answer is
cynical but tragically true. Metal mining makes a great deal of investment
sense to the foreign investors and shareholders8 and to the economic elite and

1. See infra Parts I.A & I.C.
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. INSTITUTO DE AGRICULTURA, RECURSOS NATURALES Y AMBIENTE [IARNA], PERFIL
AMBIENTAL DE GUATEMALA 2008–2009: LAS SEÑALES AMBIENTALES CRÍTICAS Y SU RELACIÓN CON EL
DESARROLLO
§ 3.8.2.1,
198–200
(2009)
[hereinafter
IARNA],
http://www.infoiarna.org.gt/media/file/PERFAM2008/PERFAM2008.pdf.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra Part II.D.2.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See infra Part I.B.3.
8. Investors that support metal mining operations in Guatemala are largely foreign, principally
from Canada. See infra Part I.A.
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self-interested politicians who profit from it.9 In turn, as a struggling
democracy with weak laws and institutions, but strongly favorable
investment laws and practices, Guatemala is the ideal host for the
continuation of corporate practices that are senseless and destructive.10
This same assessment of metal mining in Guatemala applies across the
region and globally, particularly in developing nations with similar
democratic and social struggles.11 It also applies to several other types of
industries that extract natural resources or cheap labor for global
consumption.12 Unlike Guatemala, however, some of these nations are
stepping back and instituting important reforms to limit or ban certain types
of mining.13 There are important lessons in these reforms for Guatemala.
This Article proposes recommendations for managing Guatemala’s
metal mining problem. It proceeds from the premise that metal mining is a
bad investment for Guatemala, at least in the short term. Metal mining is
never a sustainable practice for any country because metal is an exhaustible
and non-renewable natural resource and its extraction is inherently toxic and
destructive.14 There is a legitimate argument that metal mining may be
necessary for development and that it could be done in ways that significantly
reduce the harms to the environment and communities. This Article does not
address whether or how Guatemala might choose to engage in metal mining
in the future. Rather, it asserts that Guatemala is ill prepared to implement a
metal mining regime that makes sense for the country at this time.
Guatemala is now grappling—in good ways—with significant and
visible democratic problems. For the first time in the near decade of the
United Nations Commission against Impunity’s (CICIG) operation in
Guatemala, its investigations are finally exposing the shameful and cynical
acts of corrupt politicians.15 Not a single Guatemalan is surprised by the dirty
secrets the CICIG’s wiretaps and secret recordings revealed.16 Several highlevel officials resigned following the revelations, including the Vice
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See, e.g., COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA, JUSTICIA
PARA TODOS, BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO, CIUDADANOS CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN (2015),
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=boletin_informativo.
16. OBSERVATORIO DE CONFLICTOS MINEROS DE AMÉRICA LATINA, CONFLICTOS MINEROS EN
AMÉRICA LATINA, EXTRACCIÓN, SAQUEO, Y AGRESIÓN: ESTADO DE SITUACIÓN EN 2014, at 2 (2015),
http://www.conflictosmineros.net/agregar-documento/publicaciones-ocmal/conflictos-mineros-enamerica-latina-extraccion-saqueo-y-agresion-estado-de-situacion-en-2014/detail.

2016]

Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala

601

President and the President who now face criminal charges for their acts of
corruption.17 This alone represents remarkable progress for Guatemala.
These potentially monumental transitions in Guatemala, however, do not
guarantee real and sustained reforms in the country. Today, nearly 20 years
after the signing of an ambitious peace agenda, Guatemala is nowhere near a
strong enough democracy as it needs to be to manage metal mining in order
to minimize harms and maximize benefits for its citizens.18 Much needs to
happen first, including electoral reform, eradication of deep inequality,
greater transparency in public spending, and tax and social spending reforms.
This Article addresses the primary concerns that pertain to mining: reforming
the 1997 Mining Law; the need to regulate water and the consultative
process; and the need to improve transparency in tax collection, public
spending, and social investment, particularly as it relates to the mining
industry.19 These reforms must occur in tandem with the broader and
systemic reforms already mentioned if metal mining is to be successful. Until
then, Guatemala should consider banning metal mining in the country. This
course would not be unchartered territory in the region. Other nations, with
Costa Rica as one of the best examples, have paved the way.20
Banning metal mining in Guatemala, even if temporarily, will likely face
fierce opposition from investors and potentially from Guatemala’s important
trading partners. Guatemalans would be right to be concerned about two
possible negative consequences from the decision to ban or limit metal
mining: (1) companies already holding exploration and exploitation licenses
could sue in international tribunals or foreign courts for millions alleging
expropriation; and (2) Guatemala could damage its relationship with Canada,
the United States, and other potential trading partners and international
economic institutions. This Article addresses strategies and defenses for
banning mining in Guatemala in response to expropriation claims in
international tribunals. Also, it proposes standards and norms that arbitrators
should apply to resolve these claims. As to the second concern, the potential
impacts on trade and investment might be exaggerated and overstated.
Guatemala nonetheless should explore alternatives for sustainable
17. Press Release, Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, A Prisión
Preventiva
Otto
Pérez
Molina
(Sept.
8,
2015),
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=632&cntnt01showall=&
cntnt01returnid=1377.
18. Guatemala’s Peace Process: A Look Back on the 1996 Peace Accords, COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (July 30, 2015), http://www.coha.org/guatemalas-crippled-peace-process-a-lookback-on-the-1996-peace-accords/.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.B.1.
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development that would be better for the country in the long term. Costa
Rica’s ecotourism industry serves as a model for Guatemala in this regard.21
Part I of this Article explains the nature and scope of the metal mining
industry in Guatemala. It also examines the environmental, health, property,
and social impacts of metal mining and discusses the unbalanced costs and
harms of the industry under Guatemala’s status quo. Part II documents the
challenges and gaps in the existing domestic and international legal
frameworks that attempt to regulate metal mining activities in Guatemala.
Part III proposes an incremental model for Guatemala to address its metal
mining problem. First, this Article recommends that Guatemala exercise its
sovereign right to adopt a law banning all future metal mining concessions.
Second, Guatemala should rely on existing domestic laws to close the mines
in order to mitigate the substantial damages resulting from these activities.
Under either approach, Guatemala is likely to face investor liability in the
millions, and perhaps lose future investment in the country. This Article
offers Guatemala suggestions for defending and mitigating these costs by
relying on comparative studies of similar actions taken by Costa Rica and El
Salvador.
I. METAL MINING IN CONTEXT
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, investment in metals moved out of
traditional middle- and high-income countries toward the developing
world.22 And in the last ten years, due to increased demand in countries like
Brazil, India, Russia, China, and South Africa, metal mining has grown
exponentially in the world. Technological advances allowed for ever-more
diffuse deposits of minerals to be profitably mined.23 In turn, many
developing nations, including in Latin America, adopted policies designed to
encourage foreign investment, specifically in extractive industries.24 Not

21. See infra Part III.B.1.
22. Michael L. Dougherty, The Global Gold Mining Industry, Junior Firms, and Civil Society
Resistance
in
Guatemala,
10
B ULL .
LATIN
AM.
R ES .
1,
4
(2011),
http://devstudies.wisc.edu/docs/BLAR%20Early%20View.pdf.
23. Id.; see also JEAN ACQUATELLA ET AL., COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y
EL CARIBE, RENTAS DE RECURSOS NATURALES NO RENOVABLES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE:
EVOLUCIÓN
Y
PARTICIPACIÓN
ESTATAL,
1990–2010,
at
11
(2013),
http://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/7044-rentas-de-recursos-naturales-no-renovables-en-americalatina-y-el-caribe.
24. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 4.
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surprisingly, Latin America’s contributions to metal mining have been
significant in recent years.25
This transition in the metal mining industry was accompanied by the
proliferation of small or junior exploration firms in new investment target
countries.26 In general, there are three categories of firms conducting metal
mining operations in Latin America: senior firms, mid-tier firms, and junior
firms. Junior firms account for a very small share of overall mineral
production, yet they represent the majority of the metal mining companies
today.27 In practice, junior firms typically engage solely in exploration of
potential sites and have limited production sites.28 On the other hand, senior
firms typically derive their revenue from production and sale, often taking
sites explored by juniors into production.29 These specific roles undertaken
by each category of mining firm results in interdependence between them.
Senior firms depend on junior firms to undertake the exploration and junior
firms depend on senior firms to take their sites into production. Junior firms,
in fact, conduct most of the exploration of new investment targets in the
developing world and sometimes sell to senior firms only in exploitation
phases.30
While junior firms typically are not the ones engaging in the actual
exploitation of a site, they still make up the majority of the mining companies
in Latin America, and specifically in Guatemala.31 There are nine mining
firms operating in Guatemala, seven of which are junior.32 Junior firms have
proliferated for a number of reasons. Most notably, recent technological
advances in mining techniques have resulted in an increased number of
commercially viable sites, which in turn reduces the entry cost barrier for
smaller firms.33 In addition, the Canadian government incentivizes smaller

25. In 2010, for example, Latin America produced 45.3% of the world’s copper and 30.8% of
silver. The biggest producers of metals are Chile (copper), Peru (gold), Mexico (copper and silver), Cuba
(nickel), and Brazil (gold and nickel). INSTITUTO CENTROAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES, LA
MINERÍA EN GUATEMALA: REALIDAD Y DESAFÍOS FRENTE A LA DEMOCRACIA Y EL DESARROLLO (2014)
[hereinafter ICEFI REPORT], http://icefi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/mineria-impresion.pdf; see also
ACQUATELLA ET AL., supra note 23, at 27–28.
26. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4–5.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 4, 6.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 5.
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firm investment by providing tax benefits that make 100% of capital invested
in domestic junior activity tax deductible for the investor.34
While technological advances and incentivizing policies have created an
environment where newer, smaller firms can flourish, these junior firms now
find themselves in intense competition with one another. This competition
has led them to cut corners when it comes to adopting environmentally and
socially responsible techniques—presumably in an effort to simply get ahead
of the competition.35 Additionally, lenient Canadian corporate oversight has
contributed to this failure to meet environmental and social standards.36 By
the time senior firms become involved in mining, they inherit the
controversies and conflicts that their junior colleagues left behind.37
Another notable element of junior firms that leads to cutting corners has
been their demonstrated lack of motivation to engage with the host
communities in which they have set up shop.38 This could also be a result of
the intense competition these firms face, which leads them to cut corners in
order to get ahead.39 Another possible explanation for this lack of motivation
could be the simple fact that junior firms, being only focused on the
exploration of sites rather than the long-term exploitation, are less invested
in trying to form relationships with the host communities.
A. The Metal Mining Industry in Guatemala
Guatemala is not a metal-rich country, at least as measured in terms of
production. In fact, Guatemala’s economy, workforce, and exports have
traditionally been centered in agriculture.40 While metal mining represents a
significant share of the mineral industry of Guatemala, the entire industry
recently represented only 0.5% to 2.83% of the Gross National Product

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 7 (discussing how Glamis Gold, a junior firm, did not adequately consult with the local
communities about project development).
39. Id. at 12–13.
40. LYUBA ZARSKY & LEONARDO STANLEY, GLOB. DEV. & ENV’T INST., SEARCHING FOR GOLD
IN THE HIGHLANDS OF GUATEMALA: ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF THE MARLIN
MINE 13 (2011), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/marlinminereport.html.
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(GNP).41 In 2014, the entire mining industry yielded Guatemala only 0.8%
of its GNP.42
In Guatemala, both precious and base metals are mined43 and largely
exploited for export by Canadian companies. Metal mining constitutes over
90% of all mining production in the country.44 Non-metallic minerals, largely
used for industrial domestic production, are much more abundant in
volume;45 however, non-metallic mineral mining represents less than 5% of
the mining industry revenues in the country.46 Both types of mining often
lead to significant environmental harms, depending on the method of
extraction employed.47 Metal mining, however, generates more conflicts in
Guatemala than other types of mining, including hydrocarbon and nonmineral mining.48 Moreover, metal mining in Guatemala occurs principally
in rural areas, which disproportionately affects indigenous communities and
their communal lands.49
While metal mining does not represent a significant portion of
Guatemala’s GNP, it has comprised an important, but steadily declining,
portion of Guatemala’s Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Between 2010 and
41. In 2004, for example, the Ministry of Energy and Mining reported that the mineral mining
industry comprised 0.3% of the GNP. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO
2005,
at
6
(2005),
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/1._Anuario_Estadistico_Minero_2005.pdf. At its peak of production in 2011,
mining reached 2.83% of the GNP of Guatemala. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 53. In most years,
mineral mining represents only about 1% of the total GDP. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 13.
42. DEPARTMENTO DE ESTADÍSTICAS MACROECONÓMICAS, BANCO DE GUATEMALA,
PRODUCTO INTERNO BRUTO TRIMESTRAL, CUARTO TRIMESTRE DE 2014, at 7 (2015),
http://www.banguat.gob.gt/cuentasnac/4T_2014_JM.pdf.
43. IARNA, supra note 3, at 199.
44. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Activida de Económica y País de Procedencia 2012, BANCO DE
GUATEMALA, http://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujo_IED_2012.htm
&e=111758 (last visited Jan. 25, 2016); MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO
MINERO 2014, at 8 (2014) [hereinafter ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014],
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO2014.pdf.
45. Non-metallic mineral mining is projected to continue in Guatemala for several hundred
years. In contrast, most metals in Guatemala will be exhausted in about a decade. IARNA, supra note 3,
at 198, 200.
46. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014, supra note 44, at 8.
47. PEACE BRIGADES INTERNATIONAL, LA MINERÍA: ¿BENEFICIO PARA GUATEMALA? 3 (2010)
[hereinafter
PBI
MINING
BULLETIN],
http://www.peacebrigades.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/guatemala/files/spanish/PBI_Boletin_21_es
p.pdf.
48. OBSERVATORIO DE CONFLICTOS MINEROS DE AMÉRICA LATINA, CONFLICTOS MINEROS EN
AMÉRICA LATINA, EXTRACCIÓN, SAQUEO, Y AGRESIÓN: ESTADO DE SITUACIÓN EN 2014, at 2 (2014),
http://www.conflictosmineros.net/agregar-documento/publicaciones-ocmal/conflictos-mineros-enamerica-latina-extraccion-saqueo-y-agresion-estado-de-situacion-en-2014/detail.
49. Id.
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2015, Guatemala’s data (which combines agricultural and all mining
investment) show those industries’ highest share of DFI to have been in 2012
at 33.6%, or $417.8 million.50 Since then, however, the amount has dropped
significantly to 10.3% in 2015, at only $88.8 million.51 In the two years prior
to 2015, investment from mining (and agriculture) comprised 25.8% ($334.7
million) and 14.5% ($201.2 million).52 The non-renewable characteristic of
minerals, however, means that this rate of investment will likely only last for
a few more years.53
In recent years, Canadian companies have been the primary, and
sometimes sole, investors in these metal-mining projects in Guatemala.54
Most of these companies are junior, although some have established formal
and informal strategic partnerships with senior firms.55 Guatemala has
become a target for junior metal mining investment because it possesses the
right mix of flexible laws and policies and amenable mineralization to
warrant investment.56 Indeed, “this confluence of conditions has enabled
Guatemala to become one of the lowest-cost gold producers in Latin
America,” if not the world.57
Metal mining is not a new phenomenon in Guatemala,58 but it has taken
on a new intensity since the late 1990s with the end of the civil war and the
50. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Activida de Económica y País de Procedencia 2012, supra note
44.
51. Flujos de Inversión Extranjera Directa Según País de Procedencia y Actividad Económica
2007-2015, BANCO DE GUATEMALA, https://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_
bpagos/flujo_IED_2007_2015.htm&e=122316 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). The 2015 figures could reflect
several factors discussed elsewhere in this paper, including the temporary moratorium on mining
investment in the country.
52. Cuadro Flujo de IED por Actividad Económica y País de Procedencia 2013, BANCO DE
GUATEMALA,
https://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=/Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujo_IED_2013.
htm&e=111762 (last visited May 12, 2016) [hereinafter 2013 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity];
Cuadro Flujo de IED por Actividad Económica y País de Procedencia 2014, BANCO DE GUATEMALA,
www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/ver.asp?id=Publica/v_man_bpagos/flujos_IED_2014.htm&e=115682
(last
visited May 12, 2016) [hereinafter 2014 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity].
53. IARNA, supra note 3, at 200.
54. The only other notable investor has been Russia, but only for the exceptional years of 2012
and 2013. 2013 Chart of Guatemala’s Economic Activity, supra note 52; 2014 Chart of Guatemala’s
Economic Activity, supra note 52.
55. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 7.
56. Id. at 9. In Guatemala, mineral deposits are comprised generally of volcanically produced
pyroclastic and epithermal deposits. Both are relatively superficial and amenable to surface mining
techniques and cyanide leach milling processes. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Indeed, metal mining in Guatemala dates back to colonial times, possibly as early as the year
1600. ASOCIACIÓN DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES, ESTUDIO COSTO BENEFICIO DE LA MINA
MARLIN EN SAN MARCOS, GUATEMALA 15 (2010) [hereinafter MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY],
https://goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/estudio-costo-beneficio-mina-marlin.pdf.
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adoption of very favorable laws for mining companies.59 Metal mining, as an
important modern industry, dates back only to 1999 when Guatemala granted
its first major foreign investment project in more than 20 years. This project
took the form of a mining exploration license granted to Montana
Exploradora de Guatemala, a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian company
Montana Gold.60 By the time Montana Exploradora began its exploitation at
the Marlin I mine in 2005, Canadian ownership had transferred to Glamis
Gold (a junior) and then to Goldcorp (a senior), where it remains today.61 The
Marlin I project received support from the World Bank with a $45 million
loan granted through its private sector branch, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC).62 The arrival of Marlin I was “soon followed by Canadian
INCO (Hudbay Minerals since 2008), which had developed plans to reopen
the EXMIBAL nickel mine in El Estor, Izabal.”63
This Part of the Article focuses solely on the active metal mines in the
country because there is little to no information available on inactive or
pending licenses. Guatemala grants three types of mining licenses:
reconnaissance; exploration (for three years and renewable for two more
three-year periods); and exploitation (up to 25 years).64 Active mines are
those in operation pursuant to an exploitation license.65 Today, piecing
together the mining reports available from Guatemala’s Ministry of Energy
and Mining (MEM), there are a total of six active metal mining sites in
Guatemala. They are as follows: Marlin I in San Miguel Ixtahuacán and
Sipacapa, San Marcos; El Sastre in San Antonio La Paz, El Progreso; Cerro
Blanco in Asunción Mita, Jutiapa; Fenix, in El Estor, Izabal; El Escobal, in
San Rafael, Las Flores, Santa Rosa; and Extraction Project in Sechol, Alta
Verapaz.66 The government’s 2015 data, however, puts the total number of
operating metal mines (including inactive mines) at 79, with 320 more
59. Id. at 16.
60. JORIS VAN DE SANDT, MINING CONFLICTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN GUATEMALA 11
(2009),
https://www.cordaid.org/media/publications/Mining_Conflicts_and_Indigenous_Peoples_in_Guatemala.
pdf.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Ley de Minería, Decreto Número 48-97 (1997) (Guat.) [hereinafter Mining Law],
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1997/gtdcx48-1997.pdf.
65. Id.
66. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2013, at 8 (2013)
[hereinafter
ANUARIO
ESTADÍSTICO
MINERO
2013],
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO-20131.pdf; see also ICEFI
REPORT, supra note 25, at 28–30.
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pending metal mining licenses.67 The majority of the active mines are
concentrated in the following departments: Izabal, San Marcos,
Quetzaltenango, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, and Baja Verapaz. These
regions are largely inhabited by indigenous peoples. But licenses have also
been approved in the following regions: Guatemala City, Santa Rosa, Jutiapa,
Jalapa, Chiquimula, Zacapa, and el Progreso, where the non-indigenous
population is the majority.68
In the Department of San Marcos, MEM has granted a total of 22 mining
licenses, 11 of which are to Goldcorp, Inc.69 Marlin I, however, is the only
current operation in the region.70 The Marlin I mine is an example of a new
generation of mines of large size and low cost. The total development costs
of the mining project were estimated at $254 million while the total sales of
raw and exported product were estimated in 2005 to be $893 million over ten
years.71 It consists of a 20 km exploitation concession, which has been
transformed into a combined 6 km open pit and underground mine in which
gold and silver are extracted through a process of cyanide vat leaching.72 It
is estimated to produce 2.5 million ounces of gold and 36 million ounces of
silver over a lifetime of ten years.73 The mine is located within two
municipalities in the highlands populated by about 52,000 indigenous
people—San Miguel Ixtahuacán (home to 87% of the mine’s operations) and
Sipacapa.74 Poverty rates in these communities are above 97%.75 The major
industry is subsistence farming; individual families grow corn and beans and
keep livestock but the land, while held individually, forms part of the
collective property.76 Agricultural income is low due to poor soil and little

67. Licencias Vigentes y Solicitudes en Trámite por Tipo Según Categoría Mineral, MINISTERIO
DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, http://www.mem.gob.gt/mineria/estadisticas-mineras/ (follow “Licencias Vigentes

y Solicitudes en Trámite” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
68. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 30.
69. Id. at 40.
70. Id.
71. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 20.
72. Id. at 19–20.
73. Id. at 20; ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 34.
74. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: MINING IN GUATEMALA: RIGHTS AT RISK 10
(2014) [hereinafter AI MINING REPORT], https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr34/002/2014/en/.
San Miguel has 17 villages and 43 communities with a total population of about 37,000; Sipacapa has
about 14,000 residents in 12 villages and 19 communities. San Miguel Ixtahuacán, SIERRA MADRE
FOUND., http://www.fundacionsierramadre.org/FSM16a_san_miguel_ixtahuacan.htm (last visited Mar.
27,
2016);
Sipacapa,
SIERRA
MADRE
FOUND.,
http://www.fundacionsierramadre.org/FSM17a_sipacapa.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
75. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 22.
76. Id. at 21.
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irrigation infrastructure.77 Other sources of employment include seasonal
work at coffee and sugar cane plantations. The major source of income is
derived from remittances.78
El Cerro Blanco Mine, owned by Goldcorp of Canada and operated by
Entre Mares, SA of Guatemala, is located in the Trifinio Biosphere Reserve.
This mine is about 45 minutes from the border with El Salvador in Jutiapa,
which is a protected area.79 President Berger granted the mine’s exploration
license in 2004 and Goldcorp was expected to complete its final feasibility
study by 2013.80 Despite strong opposition focused on its expected
environmental impacts, the mine is currently under excavation by Dumas, a
French-Canadian underground mining contractor.81
The Fenix project is located in El Estor in Northeastern Guatemala, and
on the shore of the country’s largest freshwater lake, Lake Izabal.82 The area
is known for its rich biodiversity and its substantial nickel reserves.83Also,
“Indigenous Maya Q’eqchi’ communities represent more than 90% of the
population, most of whom make a living through subsistence farming and
fishing.”84 The mine has operated intermittently and with significant violent
strife since 1965 by Mining Exploration and Exploitation of Izabal
(EXMIBAL).85 A significant cause of conflict is that nearly 400 km2 of the
acquired land is located on indigenous historical land, which has led to
massive forced displacements of indigenous peoples.86 In June 2008, Hudbay
minerals bought Skye Resources; however, the tension over the project in the
communities remained high. In addition to the land conflicts mentioned

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Gold and Silver Mining in Cerro Blanco (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), ENVTL. JUST.
ORGS.,
LIABILITIES
&
TRADE(Jan.
16,
2015),
http://www.ejolt.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/FS_005_Cerro_blanco.pdf.
80. Id.; INT’L BUS. PUBL’N, CENTRAL AMERICA MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, VOL. 1,
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND REGULATIONS 35 (2015) [hereinafter CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL
INDUSTRY HANDBOOK]. As of 2011, Cerro Blanco contained an estimated 39,500 kilograms (kg) of
measured and indicated gold resources. Id.
81. Raising in Challenging Conditions at Cerro Blanco: Entre Mares Guatemala S.A.
(Goldcorp),
DUMAS
MINING,
http://www.dumasmining.com/Projects/InternationalProjects/CerroBlanco.aspx (last visited May 12,
2016).
82. Fénix Project, Guatemala, MCGILL RES. GROUP INVESTIGATING CANADIAN MINING LATIN
AMERICA, http://micla.ca/conflicts/fenix-project/ (last visited May 12, 2016).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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above, the communities claim they were never properly consulted.87 In
August 2011, Hudbay divested itself of the Fenix project by selling it for
$170 million to the Russian owned Solway Group.88
The Escobal mine operates in San Rafael Las Flores and neighboring
communities—Santa Rosa, the municipalities of Mataquescuintla and San
Carlos Alzatate, Jalapa.89 This mine is fairly close to the city and consists of
40 km2 to exploit gold, lead, zinc and other minerals.90 The exploitation
license was granted to Tahoe Resources Inc. in April 2013.91 The mine is
supposed to have 71.7 million ounces of recoverable silver, with a production
rate of 20 million ounces per year at a cost of less than $3 per ounce.92 The
region is generally poor,93 although there is agricultural and cattle industry in
neighboring communities.94 This project will affect indigenous peoples,
especially the Xinca.95
In 2011, the subsidiary Exploraciones Mineras de Guatemala
(Exmingua) of Radius Gold Inc. was granted a 20-km2 exploitation license
in the municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del Golfo, San
Pedro Ayampuc.96 Not unlike other mines in Guatemala, this mine has
transferred ownership several times during different phases of operation.97
Most recently in 2012, Radius Gold sold 100% of its shares in this project to
Kappes, Cassiday & Associates (KCA), a United States corporation.98 This
project, known as El Tambor, is comprised of a concession of 20 km2 to
exploit gold and silver.99 KCA’s own webpage projects that the mine will
operate for five years and expects to mine 456 thousand tons of ore.100 San

87. Id.
88. Solway Closes $170mln Deal with Hudbay to Acquire Fenix, SOLWAY GROUP,
http://www.solwaygroup.com/news_7.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
89. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 42, 44.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. AI MINING REPORT, supra note 74, at 17.
97. SIMONA V. YAGENOVA, MADRESELVA COLECTIVO ECOLOGISTA, LA MINA EL TAMBOR
PROGRESOS
VII
DERIVADA
Y
LA
RESISTENCIA
DE
LA
PUYA
28
(2014),
http://www.alainet.org/es/articulo/171685.
98. Id. at 29. KCA’s investment in the mine began in 2008 when it loaned Radius Gold $6.5
million dollars at a 51% interest rate for four years. Id.
99. Id. at 29, 31.
100. Id. at 30.
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Pedro is a largely indigenous community of Maya-Kakchikel, whereas San
José del Golfo is predominantly Ladino.101
B. The Environmental, Health, Property, and Social Effects of Metal
Mining in Guatemala
Metal mining firms “in Guatemala have fallen far short of environmental
and social responsibility.”102 “Guatemala’s mix of lenient [laws and] policies
and appropriate geology has made it a world epicenter of low-cost” metal
mining production, which is happening largely in rural and indigenous
communities and very close to residents of those communities.103 The result
has been devastating environmental and social impacts, which have provoked
an active anti-mining social movement that has precipitated repressive
responses from the State.104
1. Environmental and Health Impacts
Mineral mining in Guatemala severely impacts the environment because
mining companies chiefly engage in surface mining and direct cyanidation
milling.105 This is because mineral deposits in both the Western Highlands
and the East are relatively close to the surface.106 These types of deposits are
the least expensive and the most environmentally destructive type of gold
deposits to extract.107 All metal mining projects in Guatemala employ surface
extraction and vat leaching cyanidation to mill the ore; some, such as the
Marlin I mine, also employ underground extraction.108
Gold mining, like all metal extraction operations, is inherently
destructive of the local environment.109 Gold mining requires multiple, landdegrading steps: (1) clearing vegetation and topsoil from large tracts of land;
(2) blasting large open-pit mines and underground tunnels and hauling the
waste rock into large nearby mounds or valleys; (3) excavating a massive
amount of ore and pulverizing it into a fine powder; (4) treating the ore with
101. For a detailed socioeconomic and cultural assessment of the communities affected by the El
Tambor mine, see id. at 46–62.
102. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 6.
103. Id. at 2. For example, the El Tambor mine is less than a mile away from all of the neighboring
communities. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 42.
104. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 8.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 30.
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a mix of water, lime, and sodium cyanide; (5) leaching the solution to
separate the gold and sending it to a refining smelter, on- or off-site; and (6)
channeling leftover tailings slurry to storage in a retention pond.110 The
environment bears a heavy burden from the aforementioned steps in this
extraction process. The initial clearing destroys productive topsoil and
forests; dumping of waste rock into nearby areas destroys additional habitats;
the use of explosives damages buildings and stresses wildlife and farm
animals; smelting causes severe air pollution; acid mine drainage
contaminates local waters with heavy metals such as aluminum, arsenic,
cadmium, lead, nickel, and zinc that would have otherwise remained buried
in intact rock; and the use of cyanide leachate, even diluted, can kill fish and
sicken livestock.111
Mining also poses environmental risks to water supply and water
quality. The leaching process uses vast amounts of water, often in very dry
environments.112 For example, Marlin I requires 250,000 liters of water per
hour.113 A typical family in the area consumes approximately 30 liters a day.
At that rate of consumption, it would take a family 22 years to use the same
amount of water that the mining company uses in one hour.114 Consequently,
some have expressed doubt about the feasibility of sharing water resources
between the Marlin project and small farmers and residents of the area.115
Toxic metals in water pose special risks given the absence of water
infrastructure. Roughly half of the households near the Marlin I mine depend
on ground and river water for drinking, crop irrigation, and livestock.116 The
mine’s operations have led to major water contamination.117 The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights concluded that technical studies
demonstrate the presence of heavy metals such as iron, aluminum,

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
VINCENT CASTAGNINO, METAL MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: THE MARLIN
MINE
IN
SAN
MARCOS
17
(2006),
http://www.pbiguatemala.org/fileadmin/user_files/projects/guatemala/files/english/PBI-mining-human-rightsguate.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 40.
117. WORKING GR. ON MINING & HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AM., THE IMPACT OF CANADIAN
MINING
IN
LATIN
AMERICA
AND
CANADA’S
RESPONSIBILITY
12
(2014),
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/report_canadian_mining_executive_summary.pdf.
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magnesium, and arsenic in local rivers, including the Tzala and Riachuelo,
downstream of the tailings dam.118
All of the environmental impacts described above have health
consequences to humans and wildlife. Cyanide alone is acutely toxic to
humans and wildlife and is an important part of the extraction of gold.119
Inhalation of gaseous hydrogen cyanide of 100–300 parts per
million (ppm) can lead to death within an hour, while exposures of
20–40 ppm can lead to symptoms such as headache, weak and
rapid pulse, nausea, and vomiting. Skin exposure to a hydrogen
cyanide concentration of 100 milligrams per kilogram of body
weight can be fatal. Lower concentrations can cause severe pain,
burns, and deep ulcers that heal slowly.120

These health impacts are worse in communities in close proximity to the
mines in Guatemala.121 For several metals—lead in blood, and mercury,
arsenic, copper, and zinc in urine—concentrations were higher in residents
that lived closest to the mine (generally sites adjacent to or downstream from
the mine) when compared to individuals living farther away.122
2. Property Conflicts
Guatemala has ceded the second-highest amount of square miles in
mining concessions in Central America.123 Not surprisingly, this reality has
118. Id.; see also ASOCIACIÓN INTERAMERICANA PARA LA DEFENDA DEL AMBIENTE, IMPACTOS
HUMANOS Y SOCIALES: LA MINA MARLIN, GUATEMALA 3 (2011) [hereinafter HUMAN AND SOCIAL
IMPACTS:
THE
MARLIN
MINE],
http://www.aidaamericas.org/sites/default/files/MARLIN%20MINE%20SPANISH%20FINAL%2011-05-27%20LN.pdf
(discussing water wells drying out after mining operations commenced at the Marlin mine and the
increased risk of water contamination with cyanide, mercury, and arsenic).
119. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 31.
120. Id.
121. NILADRI BASU & HOWARD HU, TOXIC METALS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES NEAR THE
MARLIN
MINE
IN
WESTERN
GUATEMALA
13
(2010),
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/guatemala-toxic-metals-2010-05-18.html.
122. Id. at 10, 12 fig.2. See also HUMAN AND SOCIAL IMPACTS: THE MARLIN MINE, supra note
118, at 3–4 (reporting health effects such as hair loss and skin rashes since mining operations commenced
at the Marlin mine and residents who live in closer proximity to the mine have higher levels of metals
such as zinc, arsenic, copper, and mercury in urine).
123. A 2011 report from the Research Center on Investment and Commerce found that over 14%
of the entire Central American region has been ceded to mining companies in mining concessions. The
report states that Guatemala has ceded over 3,000 square miles, relying on MEM official figures. The
study concedes the figure is contested by civil society, which argues the concessions are at least four times
that figure. Silvia Nolasco, Impactos de la Minería Metálica en Centroamérica, CENTRO DE
INVESTIGACIÓN SOBRE INVERSIÓN Y COMERCIO [CEICOM] 5, 17, 19, http://www.source-
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generated a number of complex property conflicts around metal mining in
the country in both indigenous and non-indigenous communities.
With regard to indigenous peoples, these include legal conflicts resulting
from the State granting mining licenses without prior consultation from
indigenous peoples in both communal lands and in lands that are still
contested as communal but lack juridical certainty.124 Unfortunately, legal
uncertainty over communal lands in Guatemala is common because of years
of forced displacement of indigenous peoples, particularly during the civil
war; agrarian conflicts; and the absence of a functioning land titling system
in the country.125 In some cases, forced displacements have been caused
directly by mining projects.126 Moreover, land policies adopted as part of the
peace agreements have favored individual property rights over collective
ones, the latter of which are not even formally recognized in Guatemala’s
legal regime.127 Bad practices in mining companies’ acquisition of title have
aggravated tensions. Mining companies have opted to negotiate with small
private landholders of parcels adjacent to the mine without the involvement
of the state or of local communities.128 They have engaged in these practices
without even disclosing who they are and why the land is being acquired.129
3. Social Impacts
The human rights threatened by the work on the mines include rights to
health; food and subsistence; access to lands and resources; and property; as
well as human rights violations against women. Human rights violations
from metal mining projects for indigenous peoples include: “(1) loss of
traditional territories and land, eviction, migration and eventual resettlement;
(2) depletion of resources necessary for physical and cultural survival; (3)
international.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Impactos_de_la_Mineria_Metalica_en_Centroamerica.
pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
124. James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Observations on the
Situation of the Rights of the Indigenous People of Guatemala with Relation to the Extraction Projects,
and Other Types of Projects, in Their Traditional Territories, at para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.3
(June 11, 2011).
125. Id.
126. A well-documented example is the mining project El Fénix, affecting five communities in
the municipalities of El Estor, Izabal, and Panzós. Id. at para. 62.
127. Id. at para. 59.
128. Id. at para. 60.
129. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Transforming Students, Transforming Self: The Power of Teaching
Social Justice Struggles in Context, 24 P AC . M CG EORGE GLOBAL B US. & D EV . L.J. 53, 61–62 (2011)
(explaining that communities typically receive little opportunity for meaningful participation in mining
licensure).
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destruction and pollution of the traditional environment; (4) social and
community disorganization; (5) long-term negative health and nutritional
impacts; and (6) harassment and violence.”130
The impacts of metal mining on indigenous peoples’ land and resources,
food sources, and culture are devastating. These activities “have
contaminated rivers, lakes, and other ground water; left toxic wastes that
damage soils; driven away animals on which they depend for subsistence;
and devastated local ecosystems.”131 These impacts have also impaired
indigenous peoples’ human rights, including their rights to food and water
and their right to a healthy environment.132 Moreover, extractive industry
activities, including metal mining, “can result in dramatic loss of
biodiversity” on the biodiversity-rich indigenous lands.133 The failure to
respect indigenous peoples’ right to land is a violation of a right recognized
under international law,134 and precipitates conflicts and violence.135 While
states have the responsibility “to identify, demarcate, and protect indigenous
peoples’ rights over their traditional lands, it is also the responsibility of
companies to exercise due diligence and ascertain that there are no prior
claims to lands and resources by indigenous peoples.”136 Failure to do so may
result in “human rights violations where indigenous peoples assert their
rights over lands they have traditionally occupied since time immemorial.”137
The social organization of communities and their way of life is impacted
by large-scale mining projects in many ways.138 Forced displacement
disintegrates communities and social fabric and thus violates the right to the
preservation of culture. Many residents in Guatemala anticipate future illhealth and luck given that the degradation of mountains via mining activities
conflicts with Mayans’ reverence of mountains and the ritualistic and
spiritual role that mountains play in Mayan culture.139 In other indigenous
communities plagued with toxic pollution, traditional outdoor activities, such

130. JULIAN BURGER, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8,
12
(2014),
http://www.enip.eu/web/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Julian-Burger-EU-report-onextractives.pdf.
131. BURGER, supra note 130, at 12.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. WORKING GR. ON MINING AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AM., supra note 117, at 12.
139. Basu & Hu, supra note 121, at 16.
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as hunting and medicine gathering, which play integral roles in the
community’s culture, spirituality, economy, and diet, are limited.140
The forced displacement of indigenous peoples from metal mining
operations causes extensive cultural and spiritual impacts. “When a
community is driven from their lands, losing all cultural reference points, and
moves to an urban center where its members are marginalized, impoverished,
discriminated against, and dispersed, there is inevitably and with time a
forced assimilation into mainstream society.”141 Such displacement and
assimilation can lead to a loss of values, customs, and languages in these
indigenous communities, as well as erosion of social and political
structures.142 Moreover, the lands that indigenous peoples traditionally
occupy generally represent “their cultural identity, the spirits of ancestors,
and sacred sites indispensable to their religious practices.”143 Consequently,
“removal from that familiar landscape effectively denies them their religion
and the specificity of their culture.”144
Social conflicts around metal mining in Guatemala are commonplace145
and surfaced around 2003 when it became clear that Guatemala intended to
open up its territory to mega-development projects as a concerted strategy of
development.146 These conflicts exist not only in the alliance between the
State and the corporation against communities opposed to the mine, but also
within communities and families.147 In Guatemala, conflicts around mining
are intensified given the divergent and diverse perspectives on nature and
natural resources between indigenous and non-indigenous communities.148
Opposition to mining, however, is expressed by both the indigenous and nonindigenous communities most affected by the activity.
Mining conflicts in Guatemala between the affected communities and
the State stem from several factors. These include the Mining Law, which
prioritizes business interests over those of the community; weak institutions
without the legitimacy to implement laws; a lack of transparency and
140. Id.
141. Id. at 13–14.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. A 2010 study conducted by the Regional Institute of High Political Studies found that in the
101 municipalities where mining licenses have been granted in Guatemala, 78 reported some type of
conflict, in contrast to 10% reporting conflict in non-mining municipalities. INSTITUTO REGIONAL DE
ALTOS ESTADOS ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS, COMPRENDIENDO EL CONFLICTO SOBRE MINERÍA EN
GUATEMALA PARA TENDER PUENTES DE GOBERNABILIDAD 27 (2010).
146. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 12.
147. Anaya, supra note 124, at paras. 64–67.
148. INSTITUTIO REGIONAL DE ALTOS ESTADO ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS, supra note 145, at 1.
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information about mining projects; a lack of meaningful consultation with
the affected communities in the mining concessions; the environmental
harms caused by mining; and the pre-existence and continuation of historical
struggles related to land and water.149
Community opposition to mining in Guatemala has involved resistance
initiatives, which have turned violent when the State has intervened in an
attempt to repress them.150 People have been killed, arrested, and raped while
protesting the mine and in locally run referenda. Notable examples include
the resistance to the Marlin I mine for more than a decade, which has turned
violent.151 Anti-mining resistance against other mining projects has also
turned violent. The oldest mine in Guatemala, El Estor, has reported grave
violations of human rights linked to the mine since 2006. Some of these
violations were filed as civil complaints against the company in Canadian
courts.152
In 2012, community members of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del
Golfo blocked the road to the mine as a resistance strategy against El Tambor
mine.153They were able to stop the company’s machinery, even though
hundreds of police agents accompanied the corporation.154 In May 2014,
however, the government decided to remove protesters by force and several
149. Id. at 7–8.
150. See HUMAN AND SOCIAL IMPACTS: THE MARLIN MINE, supra note 118, at 4 (describing
violence that erupted as a result of communities protesting operations at the Marlin Mine).
151. In early 2004, local environmental NGOs and the Catholic Church started to draw attention
to the social and environmental damage caused by the Marlin I mine. In turn, Montana Exploradora and
the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) started to campaign to appease the population by emphasizing
the industry’s creation of jobs and development. In November 2004, several national organizations
organized a National Maya Congress and declared their opposition to mining concessions in Mayan
territory. In turn, the government in early December 2004 organized a First National Mining Forum with
support from the Canadian Embassy and invited representatives from the government, inter-governmental
groups such as the World Bank, the mining industry, and the Catholic Church, but excluded important
sectors of society. This led civil society groups to create an Alternative Forum of Resistance against
Mining. Tensions erupted into violence in January 2005 when inhabitants in the town of Los Encuentros,
Sololá launched a 40-day road blockade to stop mining machinery destined for the Marlin I mine. In
response, the government sent 1,500 police troops and 300 army soldiers to clear the road. In the
confrontation that ensued, several civilians and police officers were severely wounded and one indigenous
protester was killed by military fire. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 12, 14.
152. One case involved the murder of Adolfo Ich Chaman in 2009, a well-known indigenous antimining activist who was allegedly killed by the company. A second case, filed in 2011, involved German
Chub Choc who survived a gun attack that left him paralyzed. The third case, also filed in 2011, involved
11 Mayas-Q’eqchi women who allege being raped by the mining company’s security forces. AI MINING
REPORT, supra note 74, at 18–19. El Estor has been violent since its inception in the 1960s and was singled
out in the U.N.-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification Report as a place associated with
forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Id. at 18.
153. Id. at 17. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 66.
154. AI MINING REPORT, supra note 74, at 17; Yagenova, supra note 97, at 66.

618

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 040:597

were wounded.155 Violence has also affected the Escobal Mine in San Rafael,
Las Flores, resulting in death. By 2013, the Guatemalan government declared
states of emergency in some zones affected by protests against metal mining
and hydroelectric projects, including San Rafael, Las Flores.156 In San Rafael,
the state of emergency followed at least two deadly confrontations between
anti-mining protestors and the mine.157 The plaintiffs attempted to seek
justice in a Canadian court, but a judge of the British Columbia Supreme
Court declined to take jurisdiction of their complaint.158
Unfortunately, social tensions around mining have also led to a
generalized climate of harassment, threats, attacks, criminalization, and even
killings of human rights defenders. These defenders have played a key role
in defending the rights of the affected communities.159 Arresting and bringing
criminal charges against persons engaged in anti-mining resistance has
become a strategy for delegitimizing any effort to stop mining operations.160
Indigenous and non-indigenous leaders alike are labeled as terrorists or
violent people stubbornly opposed to all development efforts in the country.
Intra-community and intra-familial conflicts usually arise from
inequalities created by a few employees earning higher wages. Higher wages
improve the lives of the few who earn them but also increase prices for goods
in the community, which further impoverishes others.161 Similar and even
bigger impacts arise from the immigration of workers to the mine and the
emigration patterns provoked by the mine. This dynamic not only yields
155. AI MINING REPORT, supra note 74, at 17–18. In this area as well, Yolanda Oqueli, one of the
protesters, received protective measures ordered by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
after she was shot by unknown men. Id. at 17. For a more detailed description of the resistance movement,
see Yagenova, supra note 97, at 62–78.
156. AI MINING REPORT, supra note 74, at 3, 12.
157. In January 2013, two security guards and another person belonging to a group of protesters
were killed. Also, in April 2013, six protesters were wounded. Disparate versions of the violent events
exist with local communities disputing accounts by the government and company of armed resistance
against the mine. The April 2013 incident led to criminal charges against the head of the mining
company’s security, which are pending. The state of emergency meant that 3,500 soldiers and police came
to the area. After eight days, the state of emergency was changed to a state of prevention, all of which
ended in May 2013. There is military presence in the region still today. Cecilia Jamasmie, Ontario
Securities Commission Asked to Probe Tahoe Resources for Alleged Violence in Guatemala, MINING.COM
(June 3, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.mining.com/ontario-securities-commission-asked-to-probe-tahoeresources-for-alleged-violence-in-guatemala-79241/.
158. Tahoe Resources Lawsuit (re Guatemala), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR.,
http://business-humanrights.org/en/tahoe-resources-lawsuit-re-guatemala (last visited May 13, 2016).
159. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 68.
160. EQUIPO REGIONAL DE MONITOREO Y DE ANÁLISIS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN
CENTROAMÉRICA, INFORME SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y CONFLICTIVIDAD EN CENTROAMÉRICA
2013–2014, at 40 (2014), http://www.fespad.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Dddhh20141.pdf.
161. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 33.
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demographic and cultural shifts, but also increases the demand for social
services and infrastructure that are simply not there.162
C. The Financial Benefits of Metal Mining: Who Profits and How Much?
While metal mining in Guatemala is not big business, it is still a multimillion dollar industry. For example, the overall mineral production in
Guatemala in 2014 generated $765 million.163 In the last decade, mineral
production in Guatemala has fluctuated year to year. This fluctuation,
sometimes significant, occurs in response to factors such as changes in the
price of metal, increases in mining activity, and social conflict. From 2004 to
2011, Guatemala experienced exponential increases in mining production
revenues from $9 million to $941 million.164 To date, 2011 represents a peak
in mining production in Guatemala.
However, in 2012, mining production dropped significantly to $596
million.165 Two factors caused this decline in mining production. First,
production at the Marlin I mine has slowed down considerably since all
surface minerals were exhausted as of 2012 and only underground excavation
is currently taking place.166 Second, in 2011, in response to significant social
conflicts around metal mining, the government of Guatemala imposed a
moratorium on mining licenses awaiting approval of a new mining law.167
The moratorium, however, was lifted in 2012 without the approval of a new
mining law. This lifting of the moratorium, and the increased production in
the Escobal Mine in San Rafael, explains the recent increases in mining
production in the last two years.168
Unfortunately, Latin America in general, and Guatemalan people in
particular, have failed to profit from their natural resources, except for the

162. Id. at 32.
163. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2014, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting that mineral production
in Guatemala yielded 5,926.4 million Quetzales, which converts to approximately $765 million).
164. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2011, at 5 (2011),
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO2011.pdf (currency converted at 1 Guatemalan quetzal to 0.12 U.S. dollars).
165. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2012, at 6 (2012),
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO20121.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 8.
168. MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2013, at 5 (2013),
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ANUARIO-ESTAD%C3%8DSTICO-MINERO20131.pdf.
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economic elite.169 The true costs and benefits of mineral mining in Guatemala
are uncertain due to a lack of knowledge and transparency about the industry.
In general, the evidence suggests that economic growth is slower in mineralrich than mineral-poor countries, a phenomenon known as the “resource
curse.”170
The metal mining industry in Guatemala reflects the “resource curse”
phenomenon. One explanation is based on the weak mining laws in the
country, which fail both to capitalize adequately on the financial gains from
metal mining and to fairly allocate the environmental costs produced from
mining to the mining corporations.171 Moreover, elites appropriate mine
royalties and other revenues for personal consumption. This money is not
invested in building productive capacities that could capture and absorb
potential spillovers.172
For the Guatemalan elite, the expansion of mining presents a number of
advantages. First, it provides direct fiscal revenue for the State.173 This is
particularly important given how little the State collects in taxes.
Guatemala’s tax revenues as a percentage of its GDP are among the lowest
in the world, significantly below the Latin American average of 11.7%.174 As
a result, more than 85% of Guatemala’s economy is based in the private
sector, with the government contributing only about 13%.175 Guatemala’s
share of metal mining profits is relatively small compared to other countries
in the region.176 Nevertheless, the metal mining industry is still a significant
taxpayer, even though it benefits from laws to avoid paying more taxes.177

169. Id. at 52. See also ACQUATELLA, supra note 23, at 10.
170. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 15.
171. See discussion infra Parts II.B & II.C.
172. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 15.
173. Id. at 14.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. For example, the Marlin I mine’s payment in 2010 in royalties and taxes was only about 15%
of its reported earnings. Id. at 4. Another study found that between 2005 and 2009, the Marlin I mine
contributed only 13.9% of its profits to the Guatemalan economy. MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY,
supra note 58, at 10. One more study puts the figure at 12.9% between 2004 and 2009, which is well
below the regional average and other international benchmarks on best practices. ACQUATELLA, supra
note 23, at 18–19 (citing other examples in the region where the share of mining profits is much higher
than in Guatemala during similar periods: Colombia (30–35%), Chile (22.1%), and Canada (38%)).
177. For example, the Ministry of Mining has allowed them to take advantage of Decree 29-80,
The Law for the Promotion of Development and Exports and of Manufacturing (Ley de Fomento y
Desarrollo de la Actividad Exportadora y de Maquila), which has allowed them to avoid paying taxes on
the importations of equipment and goods that will be used in exploitation projects. ICEFI REPORT, supra
note 25, at 58.
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The highest tax rate paid by the industry has been less than 6%, which is
lower than the average 10–11% that applies generally in the country.178
Still, when considering all payments generated from mining, including
royalties, taxes, and licensing fees, Guatemala’s total annual gain is
significant. In the data provided by the Guatemalan government in its 2013
annual report on mining, the fiscal benefits to the State from 2010 to 2013
were as follows: $5.8 million in 2010, $9.5 million in 2011, $7.3 million in
2012, and $6.3 million in 2013.179 These amounts do not include taxes on
profit (calculated at 5% on gross sales or 31% over net gains), nor the
voluntary royalties that mining companies have paid since 2012.180
Moreover, in January 2012, 22 mining companies were reported to have
agreed to increase royalties from 1 to4% for precious metals and from 1 to3%
for non-precious metals, which would potentially yield an exponential
increase of $64 million in revenues for Guatemala.181 These royalties are
voluntary and cease when mineral prices drop below a certain level.182
Interestingly, the government has not disclosed the revenues from mining in
its annual reports since this agreement was reached. Perhaps because of this
failure to disclose, Guatemala’s reported earnings from metal mining diverge
significantly from those reported by the industry itself. According to the
World Gold Council data, in 2013, Guatemala received $52 million in
payments to the government.183
In addition to public revenues, mining companies stimulate the economy
in other ways. Mining companies source a number of goods and services in
host countries, including machinery and equipment; energy and water; and

178. Id. at 60.
179. ANUARIO ESTADÍSTICO MINERO 2013, supra note 66, at 14 tbl.2 (currency converted at 1
Guatemalan quetzal to 0.12 U.S. dollars).
180. Id.
181. Guatemala: Gold, Silver Mines to Pay 4% Royalties, C ENTRAL AMERICA DATA . COM (Jan.
27,
2012),
http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_Metal_Mines_to_Pay
_Royalties_of_4.
182. ICEFI REPORT, supra note 25, at 57; Sigfrido Lée L. y María Isabel Bonilla de Anzueto,
Contribución de la Industria Minera al Desarrollo de Guatemala, CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES
ECONÓMICAS NACIONALES [CIEN] 45 (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.tequila-guatemala.com/cien/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/mineria2009.pdf.
183. WORLD GOLD COUNCIL, RESPONSIBLE GOLD MINING AND VALUE DISTRIBUTION, 2013
DATA: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE CREATED AND DISTRIBUTED BY MEMBERS OF
WORLD GOLD COUNCIL 40–41 (2014), http://www.gold.org/gold-mining/economicTHE
contribution/value-distribution.
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construction, transport, and food services.184 These procurement profits
dwarf payments in royalties and taxes.185
According to one study, procurement benefits that go directly to
businesses and contractors constituted nearly two-thirds of the total
economic gains from mining in 2013.186 These procurement gains are
typically substantial in the national economy but provide limited benefits to
the localities.187 Mining also offers other macroeconomic benefits such as
export earnings, high-paying jobs, and technology and knowledge
spillovers.188 Metal mining produces few direct jobs but the average wage is
more than double that in manufacturing and triple that in agriculture.189
Moreover, an important indirect benefit from metal mining is the creation of
indirect jobs.190 Finally, although social investment by mining companies is
low,191 there are some gains for local communities.192 When all of these
contributions are calculated, they can be substantial.193
However, there are three significant reasons why the economic gains
from metal mining in Guatemala do not represent a good investment for the
country. First, few of these gains ever reach the majority of Guatemalans.
Royalties and all other revenues generated from mining go into the general
public funds. This allocation of funds makes it impossible to tell how the
State spends the revenue. Rampant corruption in Guatemala, and a lack of
184. “According to the Guatemalan think tank CIEN, for every 100 quetzales worth of production,
mining companies source an average 27 quetzales from local sectors. It also found the number of indirect
jobs generated by procurements in the mining sector was six times greater than the number of direct jobs.”
ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 14 (citing Sigfrido Lée L. y María Isabel Bonilla de Anzueto,
supra note 182).
185. For example, in 2009 alone, procurement payments for materials, equipment, and supplies
was $86.6 million. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 23–24. The industry’s data puts this figure at
$189 million dollars, which is 68% of the total in-country expenditures for the country. WORLD GOLD
COUNCIL, supra note 183, at 40–41.
186. WORLD GOLD COUNCIL, supra note 183, at 40–41.
187. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 24 (suggesting only a 5% gain from procurement by
localities in 2009).
188. Id. at 14.
189. Id. By the industry’s own data, in 2013, there were 3,142 employees and contractors working
for the gold industry in Guatemala, which produced $33 million in wages and salaries. WORLD GOLD
COUNCIL, supra note 183, at 40–41.
190. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 23.
191. There is no precise data on the types and amount of social investment from metal mining in
Guatemala. Id. at 42. The industry’s own 2013 data, however, has identified four million dollars in
community investments. WORLD GOLD COUNCIL, supra note 183, at 40–41.
192. Social investment from the Marlin I mine, for example, included the provision of primary
school teacher salaries and the building of a health clinic. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 24.
193. At least two reports estimate the Marlin I mine’s contributions to the Guatemalan economy
in a period of four years to be between $97 and $182.5 million. Id. at 25. See also MARLIN MINE COST
BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 10 (estimating a contribution of 748.87 million quetzales).
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transparency in public spending laws and practices, guarantee poor
accounting regarding how national and local governments spend the funds.194
There is little evidence that much of these monies have been invested in
public goods such as education, health, and infrastructure.195
Second, environmental and social harms significantly outweigh any
economic benefit, not only over the lifetime of the mine, but also in the postclosure phase.196 As documented in Part I.B. of this article, there are
significant property, environmental, and economic harms from metal mining,
especially to local residents.197 While these costs are difficult to calculate, a
few studies suggest that they are much higher than the economic benefits that
metal mining provides.198 One reason for this reality is that under current
Guatemalan law, mining companies bear little to no responsibility for
repairing or mitigating environmental harms to communities.199
Third, the current political structure unfairly forces local communities
where mining occurs to bear the impacts from mining, while almost all
economic gains from the activity are centralized. According to one study in
2009, over 90% of all economic gains from metal mining flowed to the
national government or to workers and businesses outside of the local
communities affected by mining.200 In Guatemala, this is particularly
egregious because these rural communities, comprised largely of indigenous
populations, have principally experienced oppression or abandonment by the
central government.201 Moreover, these mining projects have been imposed
on these communities despite their strong opposition to metal mining in their
territories.202 However, local communities are not doing any better than the
government in managing the funds they are receiving from mining. It is not
clear how local communities are spending their royalty money, though most
report it is principally going to infrastructure projects benefitting the mine

194. See infra Part II.E.
195. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 4–5.
196. Id. at 42. See also MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 12.
197. See supra Part I.B.
198. According to a 2010 report of the Marlin I mine, ASĺES calculated that the costs of the Marlin
I mine were 3.5 times greater than the benefits even without accounting for long-term environmental
liabilities in the post-closure phase. MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 13.
199. See infra Part II.B.
200. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 27.
201. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Combined Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013, Guatemala, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GTM/14-15
(Oct. 28, 2013).
202. See infra Part II.D.2.
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itself.203 It also does not appear that local governments, with some
exceptions, are engaged in sustainable projects expected to last beyond the
projected duration of the mine.204
II. THE METAL MINING REGIME IN GUATEMALA
Legal reforms, either to the Mining Law itself or to water and
consultation laws, are necessary to improve the way mining is conducted in
Guatemala. But legal reforms alone will not suffice. Guatemala’s challenges
with mining are structural and political. Guatemala’s weak democracy
reveals itself in its ineffective institutions and its corrupt political actors who
are not accountable to the people and to the public good. Part II of this Article
attempts to explain the challenging landscape that hampers the effective
regulation of metal mining in Guatemala.
A. The 1985 Constitution and Norms Relevant to Natural Resources
The 1985 Guatemalan Constitution, which still governs today, is a fairly
progressive document. Notably, it includes provisions governing
environmental and human rights.205 The weakness has been in its
implementation. Laws adopted subsequent to the Guatemalan Constitution
have prioritized provisions that encourage development and foreign
investment over provisions that protect the environment, natural resources,
or human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples. Moreover, poor
funding, political marginalization, and decentralization weaken the state
institutions charged with enforcing environmental norms and human rights
affected by the exploitation of natural resources.206
Regarding natural resources, Article 121 of the Guatemalan Constitution
declares that the subsoil and any minerals, hydrocarbons, or other organic or
inorganic substances are the property of the State.207 Article 125 of the
Guatemalan Constitution declares that the technical and rational exploitation
of hydrocarbons, minerals, and other non-renewable natural resources is of
public utility and need and further that the State will establish and propriate
its own conditions for their exploration, exploitation, and
203. See VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 20 (explaining that local communities receive 0.5% of
gross revenues as royalties that are invested in infrastructure projects).
204. Id. at 28. One such exception is Sipacapa, which has engaged in grassroots-led efforts to
identify and implement sustainable productive projects. Id. at 47–50.
205. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 2, 97.
206. See infra Part II.C.
207. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 121(e).

2016]

Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala

625

commercialization.208 Thus, the Guatemalan Constitution centralizes
decisions governing natural resources exclusively in the national
government, not localities. In fact, Guatemala’s Constitution only recognizes
decentralized powers when these have been expressly delegated to localities
by two-thirds of the Congress.209 The Guatemalan Congress has adopted laws
that promote decentralization specifically to promote regional economic
development and indigenous peoples’ self-determination.210 Moreover,
Article 173 of the Guatemalan Constitution establishes a right to a
referendum procedure whenever there are political decisions of special
significance.211 Some have suggested that the nature and scope of mining in
Guatemala warrants a referendum.212 However, in practice, mining decisions
have been the exclusive jurisdiction of the central government.
Guatemala’s Constitution also contains a number of important
fundamental rights that are linked to environmental protection. To the extent
that environmental preservation is linked to the protection of life, Articles 1–
3 of the Guatemalan Constitution, which protect human life, can also be said
to pertain to environmental protection.213 In addition, if the right to health is
linked to environmental protection, then Articles 93 and 98 of the
Guatemalan Constitution are also relevant.214 Article 64 governs per se
environmental protection. That Article establishes that the State shall
conserve, protect, and improve the natural resources that belong to the
people.215 As such, it requires the State to adopt laws creating national parks
and protected areas.216
In addition, Article 97 obligates the State at all levels and throughout the
national territory to promote social, economic, and technological
development that would prevent contamination of the environment and
maintain ecological balance.217 To support this objective, the State is
obligated to issue the necessary regulations to guarantee that use of the fauna,
flora, land, and water may be realized rationally, preventing their
depredation.218 Article 126, in turn, declares the urgent public need for
208. Id. at art. 125.
209. Id. at art. 34.
210. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Municipal Code, the General Law on Decentralization,
and the Law of Councils on Urban and Rural Development).
211. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 173.
212. MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 22.
213. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 1–3.
214. Id. at art. 93, 98.
215. Id. at art. 64.
216. Id.
217. Id. at art. 97.
218. Id.
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reforestation and for the special protection of forest and vegetation on the
banks of rivers and lakes.219 Finally, Article 127 declares that water is a
public good and an inalienable right. Furthermore, Article 127 declares that
the law should govern water’s use.220
Guatemala’s Constitution also contains other important provisions
addressing the right to property, cultural rights, and the rights of indigenous
peoples. These provisions are relevant to regulating mining. For example,
Article 64 protects the national heritage and establishes a state duty to protect
natural sanctuaries.221 Article 67 governs the protection of indigenous
agricultural lands,222 while Article 39 protects property as an inherent right
and requires the State to create the conditions necessary to enable owners to
use and enjoy their property.223 Many of these same rights are protected in
international human rights treaties ratified by Guatemala, which under
Article 46 of the Guatemalan Constitution are declared to have preeminence
over internal laws.224
B. The 1997 Mining Law
Guatemala’s Mining Law was adopted in 1997; a year after Guatemala
signed the peace agreements ending its civil war.225 Then-President Álvaro
Arzú, a businessman who represented the transition from a military to a civil,
business-friendly
government,
simultaneously
privatized
the
telecommunications industry, railroads, and the energy sector. Arzú devised
the new mining and investment law as a strategy to attract foreign capital and
jump start the Guatemalan economy.226 Privatization was a strategy
throughout Central America, which spurred a race to the bottom between
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to outbid one another for foreign
investment in mining and energy.227
The first of the two most important changes to the Mining Law was the
end to the proscription against 100% foreign ownership of mining
enterprises. The next important change was the reduction of royalties on
219. Id. at art. 126.
220. Id. at art. 127.
221. Id. at art. 64.
222. Id. at art. 67.
223. Id. at art. 39.
224. Id. at art. 46. The most important international treaty pertaining to metal mining in Guatemala
is ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples. See infra Part II.D.2.
225. Mining Law, supra note 64.
226. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 9.
227. Id. at 10.
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gross revenues to the government from 6% to 1%, to be shared equally
between the central and municipal governments.228 This 1% royalty became
the lowest in the region, lower than the 3% adopted by El Salvador a year
earlier.229 In addition, mining corporations are exempted from paying various
taxes, including taxes on water use or on imported machinery.230
The 1997 Mining Law is also notable for what it did not include. One
significant omission pertained to the relationship between the extraction of
natural resources in indigenous territories and the rights of indigenous
peoples. In 1995, as part of the peace agreements, Guatemala signed the
Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples.231 In 1996,
Guatemala ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention
169.232 Each of these instruments was critical to ensure that development did
not undermine the sovereignty or infringe the fundamental rights of
indigenous peoples.
Yet the Mining Law does not include provisions requiring free, prior,
and informed consent. Also, it does not recognize indigenous peoples’
collective land rights or their cultural attachment to ancestral territories and
natural resources. Quite the contrary, the Mining Law prescribes favorable
easements in public and private property to permit mining activities. For
public lands, it requires only prior consent from the responsible government
agency, which the Law says should cooperate to grant the easement.233 On
private lands, a mining company may either negotiate agreements with the
private owners, subject only to arbitration to resolve disputes,234 or may
compel such agreements simply by going to a trial judge whose decision is
not subject to appeal.235 The Mining Law also does not exempt protected
areas from mining activities.

228. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 63 (explaining that mining royalties shall be split evenly
between the Guatemalan State and municipal governments); see also Dougherty, supra note 22, at 10.
229. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 10.
230. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 11.
231. U.N. Secretary-General, Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/49/882
annex
(Apr.
10,
1995),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_950331_AgreementIdentityAndRightsOfInd
igenousPeoples.pdf.
232. Convention 169, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, Jun. 27, 1989, 72 ser. A INT’L LAB. ORG. OFFICIAL BULL. 59 (1989) [hereinafter Convention
Concerning Indigenous Peoples]; Official Measures Taken Regarding Decisions of the International
Labour Conference, 79 ser. A INT’L LAB. ORG. OFFICIAL BULL. 51 (1996) (listing Guatemala as having
ratified Convention No. 169 on June 5, 1996).
233. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 73.
234. Id. at art. 77.
235. Id. at art. 79.
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The Mining Law is extremely weak in its environmental requirements
and contains notable omissions. The Law designates MEM to regulate
mining in the country and to issue licenses.236 Mining licenses require that
the petitioning company submit a “mitigation study” but fail to define or
provide standards for such studies, except to establish that MEM must rule
on the sufficiency of the study within 30 days. If MEM does not rule within
the 30-day period, the study becomes approved by law.237 The company must
also submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) (formerly known as the
National Commission of the Environment) and, when mining occurs in
protected areas, the company must also submit an EIA to the National
Council of Protected Areas (CONAVI).238
The Mining Law, however, fails to provide standards or procedures for
assessing the EIA or to establish monitoring mechanisms, except to state that
the EIA must be resolved within 30 days.239 The accompanying regulations
adopted in 2001 also failed to specify greater substantive norms and
procedures for approving the EIA.240
Several amendments in 2003, 2007, 2010, and 2015 improved the
procedures.241 In general, the standards adopt three levels of environmental
impact assessment. Category A has a set of procedures and applies to projects
likely to have a high environmental impact.242 These standards establish and
define the scope of the technical instruments mining companies must submit
for an EIA evaluation. The standards include an evaluation of environmental
and social impacts,243 and prescribe monitoring steps, including audits, which
MARN must undertake to ensure compliance.244 The new standards permit
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 20.
Id.
Reglamento de la Ley de Minería, Acuerdo Gubernativo 176-2001, art. 7–9 (2001), reprinted
in MINISTERIO DE ENERGÍA Y MINAS, LEY DE MINERÍA Y SU REGLAMENTO 30 (2001),
http://www.mem.gob.gt/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/2._Reglamento_a_Ley_de_Mineria_Acuerdo_Gubernativo_176_2001.pdf.
241. See generally Ministerio de Ambiente y Recursos Naturales [MARN] Reglamento de
Evaluación, Control, y Seguimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 23-2003 (2003), amended
by MARN Reglamento de Evaluación, Control, y Seguimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo Gubernativo Número
431-2007 (2007), amended by MARN Reglamento de Evaluación, Control, y Seguimiento Ambiental,
Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 173-2010 (2010) and MARN Reglamento de Evaluación, Control, y
Seguimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 60-2015 (2015).
242. MARN Reglamento de Evaluación, Control, y Seguimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo
Gubernativo Número 60-2015 at art. 13, 3539 [hereinafter MARN Governmental Decree].
243. Id. at art. 11.
244. Id. at art. 4952.
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MARN to seek input from private and public entities, and mandate that
MARN consult the National Commission on Protected Areas when mining
projects occur in protected areas.245
The standards also require the reasons for denial of an EIA petition,
including when the negative environmental impacts outweigh the benefits of
the project, or when MARN inspectors have been denied access to the area.246
The new standards also demand that MARN determine the payment of a bond
in case the mine closes. MARN may also determine a separate amount of
necessary insurance coverage for environmental risks.247 Finally, the
standards regulate sanctions and fines for non-compliance, though in general
these tend to be low.248
These standards are not adequately enforced due to political and
economic constraints. MARN has faced political pressure under different
administrations to ensure that metal mining projects are not rejected based
on environmental impact assessments.249 MARN is significantly
understaffed, underfunded, ill-equipped, and politically marginalized in
contrast to MEM, which is eager to promote mining investment.250 Critics
have noted that MARN cannot—and does not—undertake the control and
monitoring of the EIAs that these projects require.251 The agency spends most
of its limited resources on the bureaucratic process of approving mining
licenses and does almost nothing to provide ongoing oversight and
accountability for non-compliance after approval.252
Unfortunately, MARN’s weakness in the EIA process has meant that
mining companies can manage concerns over environmental harms by
controlling the environmental impact studies.253 For example, the Marlin I
mine continues to operate despite significant weaknesses in the EIA process
revealed by the IFC and other independent assessments.254 Calls by the ILO
245. Id. at art. 17.
246. Id. at art. 19.
247. Id. at art. 5664, art. 8082.
248. Id. at art. 8894.
249. Dougherty, supra note 22, at 11 (documenting that the presidency of Oscar Berger (2004–
2008), in particular, aggressively pursued foreign mining investment and pressured MARN not to reject
mining projects).
250. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 24–25.
251. See, e.g., IARNA, supra note 3, at 211.
252. Id.
253. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 7.
254. Id. at 35. In 2005, the Marlin I mine’s own IFC Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO)
found that “the [EIA] prepared by Glamis failed to identify all water users downstream from the mine,
fully assess the potential for acid mine drainage, fully assess the potential for other water contaminants,
or establish water quality standards . . . .” Id. at 34. Furthermore,
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and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to suspend the Marlin
I mine only led to an administrative process and an inter-ministerial
investigation of impacts. Ultimately, that process concluded that the mine did
not pose a threat to community water supplies or human health.255 Similarly,
other experts have singled out the EIA study for the El Tambor mine and
determined that it was significantly lacking.256 Other experts have diverged
significantly from the official EIA approved by MARN to find that the El
Tambor mine will have significant ill effects on the environment, including
on water depletion and contamination.257
Aside from the mitigation and environmental impact requirements, the
Mining Law does not require reclamation upon completion of mining
operations. Mining reclamation, which seeks to minimize or mitigate the
environmental effects of mining, is supposed to be a regular part of modern
mining practices.258 Either during mining operations or after they cease,
reclamation involves restoring mined land to a natural or economically
usable condition.259
Article 66 establishes a nominal fee for opting to transfer an exploration
or exploitation license;260 however, it is silent as to whether that transfer can
In 2010, the U.S.-based consulting firm E-Tech International produced a
comprehensive evaluation of predicted and actual water quality around the mine.
The report found that the [EIA] “provided limited information on the baseline
environmental setting in and around the Marlin Mine” and should have included
more information about “water quality, water quantity and levels, and the
abundance and health of aquatic biota.” . . . The review also found that the [EIA]
provided no evidence to support its claim that the “acid generation and contaminant
leaching potential of the rocks [were] low.” . . . The lack of adequate baseline data
continues to impede environmental and health oversight.
Id. at 35 (internal citations omitted) (quoting E-TECH INT’L, EVALUATION OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL
WATER
QUALITY
AT
THE
MARLIN
MINE,
GUATEMALA
5–6
(2010),
http://www.etechinternational.org/guatemala/ (follow link to “Download” under “Final Report”).
255. Id. at 12.
256. As Yagenova explains, the study was conducted by the Grupo Sierra Madre Internacional
S.A. Yagenova questions their independence given that they are paid by the mining company to conduct
the study. Moreover, an independent assessment of the EIA conducted by American environmental
engineers Dr. Robert Robinson and Dr. Robert Durán found several deficiencies, including that water
usage only focuses on access to water for mining and not on its effects on neighboring communities, and
that monitoring plans are extremely vague as are recovery plans after the mine’s closure. Yagenova, supra
note 97, at 35–36, 41–42.
257. Id. at 45–46.
258. See, e.g., What Happens to Mine Sites after a Mine is Closed?, MININGFACTS.ORG,
http://www.miningfacts.org/environment/what-happens-to-mine-sites-after-a-mine-is-closed/
(last
visited May 15, 2016).
259. Id.
260. Article 66 establishes a fee from between three to nine units during each year that they hold
an exploration license, as well as a fee of three units per km2 for ending or transferring an exploration
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simply be back to the government. Article 71, which governs water
contamination, requires that those who make use of water in their mining
operations must adequately treat the water to avoid environmental
contamination.261 Any regulation of the abandonment or closure of a mine is
done indirectly through the EIA and mitigation studies. Nothing in the law
requires MARN or the holder of the license to comply with the promises or
commitments made in the original licensing agreement.262
Not surprisingly, mining reclamation practices in Guatemala have been
poorly managed. For example, Montana Exploradora Mine provided a $1
million dollar surety bond to be used to reclaim the mine in the event of a
company default.263 This amount is trivial compared to reclamation bonds
required of mining operations in developed nations264 and is vastly
inadequate for the scope of the mining project.265 The insufficient surety
funds for the Marlin I mine expose the government, local residents, and the
environment to significant risks if the company fails to properly reclaim the
mine. These risks include ongoing pollution from acidic toxic metals, erosion
and sedimentation, and altered lands that cannot be returned to prior uses.266
Article 51 of the Mining Law does, however, regulate the involuntary
suspension of a mining project. The suspension grounds include: (a) when
there is imminent risk or danger to life or property; (b) when labor security
has been violated; (c) when environmental laws have been violated; (d) when
the subsoil fee has not been paid; (e) when royalties have not been paid; (f)
for non-compliance with Article 85 of the law (a requirement that those who
export mining products have a license to do so); (g) failure to submit reports
required by law; and (h) when what has been approved for exploitation and
what is actually being exploited are not proportionate.267 Although Article 51
contemplates suspension based on significant personal or property harms and
license and five units per km2 for ending or transferring an exploitation license. Article 67 clarifies that
one unit can mean from 100 quetzales (about $12) to about 1000 quetzales (about $130), as established
by MEM. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 66–67.
261. Id. at art. 71.
262. IARNA, supra note 3, at 203.
263. KEITH CAMPBELL ET AL., RECLAMATION ISSUES AND ESTIMATED COST OF RECLAMATION
MARLIN
MINE,
at
1
(Molly
Butler
et
al.
trans.,
2011),
https://goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/reclamation-issues-and-estimated-cost-ofreclamation-marlin-mine.pdf.
264. Id. (providing four examples of reclamation fees at mines in Colorado that range from $7.4
million all the way to $99 million dollars).
265. Id. at 9–12 (estimating that the surety bond should be $49 million dollars (or approximately
389 million quetzales) to cover such costs as surface water treatment, removing and recovering land and
revegetation, demolition and removal of buildings, and erosion control).
266. Id. at 1.
267. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51.
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based on violations to the environmental laws, its effectiveness is limited by
weak enforcement as MEM is perceived to be deeply biased in favor of
mining enterprises.268
The other significant weakness of the Mining Law pertains to public
participation. The only mention of public participation in the law is found in
Article 46, which governs procedures for stating opposition to a mine. Article
46 merely requires that opposition must be submitted prior to the issuance of
the license and has to be based on failure to comply with Article 41.269 Article
41 lists the formal requirements for obtaining a license, such as the names
and citizenship or passport information of those seeking the license,
specification of the territory, and type of activity sought.270 It does not
mention mitigation or environmental impact studies.
The most recent 2015 governmental decree, however, has improved the
opportunity for public participation in the EIA, at least in theory. The process
is supposed to involve a public notice of the EIA study of at least 20 days,
during which time the public may express its opposition.271 Unfortunately,
the method chosen to provide this notice—a written notification in a public
newspaper—is not effective in communities where many residents do not
read. Notably, a reform to include such an announcement on the radio and in
indigenous languages was expressly rejected in the promulgation of recent
regulations.272
The new regulations also include other good practices that are not
implemented because of MARN’s limited resources. First, the EIA must post
its resolution of the EIA online, in Spanish, and in the predominant local
languages.273 In practice, this mandate is not met. In a recent interview with
MARN officials, we confirmed that their distribution practice remains
unchanged despite the new regulations.274 Second, MARN must make public
a highly technical document—that few can understand—in Spanish for 20
days solely in its offices in Guatemala City.275 Unfortunately, these existing
procedures for public participation simply do not work. In fact, it is not

268. See, e.g., Aldana, supra note 128, at 82–85 (explaining how it is critical to account for the
political forces that dictate “action or inaction in a given case”).
269. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 46.
270. Id. at art. 41.
271. MARN Governmental Decree, supra note 242, at art. 32.
272. Interview with MARN official, Guatemala (July 2015).
273. MARN Governmental Decree, supra note 242, at art. 31.
274. Interview with MARN official, supra note 273.
275. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 21.
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uncommon for communities affected by mining to learn about projects in
their communities when the machinery appears.276
C. Guatemala’s Environmental Laws
Guatemala’s environmental legal regime is weak and largely
decentralized. The problem is not so much an absence of laws277—although
there are some important gaps discussed in Part II.D below—but rather
numerous institutions with overlapping mandates and little coordination that
are overworked and under-resourced.278 Moreover, there is simply no
political will to enforce environmental laws that apply to mining activities;
including laws regulating deforestation, protected areas, biodiversity, and
water.279
For nearly 20 years from the adoption of Guatemala’s constitution
establishing the modern environmental regime, the environmental laws have
been dedicated nearly exclusively to regulating protected areas and
biodiversity. This is, in part, a response to priorities established by funders,
such as USAID, and foreign environmental nongovernmental groups.280 In
the last decade, however, environmental laws have shifted away from
protected areas to address deforestation and climate change.281 Despite these
gains in some areas of environmental law, robust application of these laws to
mining is not contemplated.
Technically, the general Law on the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment282 and its regulations are supposed to apply to mining activities
in Guatemala.283 This Law contains several provisions that should regulate
the adverse environmental consequences of mining. The Law, for example,
calls for the rational use of natural resources in the subsoil in order to prevent

276. Id. at 64–65 (explaining that 14 years after the State first granted a license of
acknowledgment to Glamis Gold and even months after the exploitation license was approved, the MEM
finally admitted to the community that a mining license existed in the region).
277. Yagenova states that since 1930, more than 1,200 environmental laws and regulations have
been adopted in Guatemala. Id. at 21.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Mario Mancilla, Algunos Antecedentes y Estructura del Derecho Ambiental en Guatemala
910 (2015) (unpublished thesis, Universidad Pontifica de Salamanca Spain) (on file with author).
281. Id. at 10.
282. Ley de Protección y Mejoramiento del Medio Ambiente, Decreto Número 6886,http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Guatemala/GT_Ley_Proteccion_Medio_Ambi
ente_68_86.pdf.
283. MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 17.
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contamination and achieve ecological balance.284 It prohibits the storage of
toxic waste likely to contaminate the environment.285 It requires an
environmental impact assessment prior to the approval of any development
project likely to deplete natural resources.286 It calls for the regulation of
water access and quality.287 When read in conjunction with the Mining Law,
however, it is vague in determining, assessing, and imposing sanctions based
on environmental harms caused by mining.288
Moreover, MARN, which is charged with enforcement, is too weak and
is often undermined by MEM. Mining companies seize on these weaknesses
to ignore environmental sanctions, even when they are imposed.289 MARN
is only involved in mining concessions too late in the process—after the
exploration phase, when it is clear that MEM has decided to push forward
with the project.290 MARN has no role in the mitigation impact study, which
is solely approved by MEM during the exploration phases of a mining
project.291 Also, the Mining Law does not even exclude mining from
protected areas. Finally, Guatemala’s Criminal Code penalizes certain
environmental crimes where actions result in the intentional destruction of
publicly-owned natural resources and goods. These crimes include the illegal
exploitation of natural resources, illegal deforestation, and the destruction of
protected species.292 The codification of these crimes, however, has not
resulted in prosecutions because prosecutors often rely on MEM for its
technical evidentiary findings and often dismiss cases based on lack of
proof.293

284. Ley de Protección y Mejoramiento del Medio Ambiente, Decreto Número 68-86,
http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Guatemala/GT_Ley_Proteccion_Medio_Ambient
e_68_86.pdf.
285. Id. at art. 6.
286. Id. at art. 8.
287. Id. at art. 15.
288. MARLIN MINE COST BENEFIT STUDY, supra note 58, at 17.
289. Id. at 17–18 (discussing a fine imposed by MARN to Montana Exploradora for the
transportation of cyanide, which the company refuses to pay, alleging it has authority to transport it).
290. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 22.
291. Id.
292. MINISTERIO PÚBLICO, MÓDULO EDUCATIVO: NOCIONES DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL 72–76
(2011), http://www.funsepa.net/guatemala/docs/mda.pdf.
293. This happened, for example, in a case filed in 2006 against the Marlin I mine for water
contamination, which MEM did not certify. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
ASSESSMENT
OF
GOLDCORP’S
MARLIN
MINE
app.
F
at
1
(2010),
http://s1.q4cdn.com/038672619/files/doc_issues/HRA_Appendix_F_Legal_Cases.pdf (discussing Case
No. 1227-2007, filed by Colectivo Madreselva, alleging that the Marlin I mine had contaminated the Tzalá
River).
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D. Governance Gaps
1. Water Usage and Water Quality
There is a provision in the 1985 Constitution stating that water is an
inalienable right the use of which should be regulated by law.294 But
Guatemala has yet to adopt a water law, despite several attempts to do so.295
The absence of water laws and regulations in the country means that issues
such as access to water, water usage, and water contamination from mining
activities are left entirely unregulated.296 Indeed, in Guatemala, and
throughout Latin America, a principal cause of water conflict is not
necessarily water scarcity, but rather unregulated and unsustainable use of
water for commercial purposes.297 The extractive industry produces two
types of problems for Guatemala: excessive uses of water and water
contamination.298 Moreover, mining’s reliance on large bodies of water
means that mining companies strategically place mining operations near
water basins. This puts pressure on that water, which is felt by several
communities that depend on that water source.299
There are a few provisions in existing laws that Guatemala could use to
regulate mining companies’ water use. Guatemala’s Mining Law grants those
who have acquired mining licenses the right to make rational use of water as
long as it does not affect the permanent exercise of other rights. The Law also
establishes that waters running in their natural riverbeds or found in lagoons
that are not in public domain or common usage shall be regulated by the Civil
Code and other relevant laws.300 However, these norms are not implemented.
MARN also sets standards for water quality, but enforcement is lagging
because MARN does not regularly monitor water quality.301
A significant ruling of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court on
September 28, 2015 revealed the promise and perils of water law as applied
294. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 127.
295. FRANZ ROJAS ORTUSTE, POLÍTICAS E INSTITUCIONALIDAD EN MATERIA DE AGUA POTABLE
AMÉRICA
LATINA
Y
EL
CARIBE
38–39
(2014),
Y
SANEAMIENTO
EN
http://www.pseau.org/outils/ouvrages/cepal_politicas_e_institucionalidad_en_materia_de_agua_potable
_y_saneamiento_en_america_latina_y_el_caribe_2014.pdf.
296. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 53.
297. LIBER MARTÍ & JUAN BAUTISTA JUSTO, ANÁLISIS, PREVENCIÓN Y RESOLUCIÓN DE
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE 11 (2015),
CONFLICTOS
POR
EL
AGUA
EN
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/37877/S1500220_es.pdf?sequence=1.
298. Id. at 1314.
299. Id. at 14.
300. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 71.
301. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 35.
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to mining, however, strong pronouncements of law yield little effect when
implemented by weak institutions.302 The ruling established a novel
precedent by declaring water a fundamental human right that requires
prioritizing human consumption of water over commercial uses.303 The ruling
resulted from a challenge to the El Escobal mining license concession
alleging that mining threatened to significantly contaminate water quality.304
While the Constitutional Court seriously considered the challenge, the Court
could not verify its factual veracity because MARN had not monitored the
mine since its operation began two years earlier.305 The insufficient record
prevented the Court from granting the claimant’s requested remedy—the
suspension of the mine.306 Instead, the Court simply ordered MARN to do its
job and assess the degree to which mining affected water access and quality
in the affected communities.307 The impact of this ruling is not yet known
and is likely to be negatively affected by the political transition in the
country.308
2. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
In Guatemala, the right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) with
respect to metal mining suffers from an implementation gap. This gap results
from a lack of political will to determine the nature and scope of this right.
Guatemala has a legal regime governing the consultative process that could
be implemented effectively. But this legal regime requires further regulations
and clarity, which the State has refused to provide. As a result, there is
302. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] Sept. 28, 2015, Expediente Número
4617-2013 (on file with author).
303. Id. slip op. at 27–28.
304. Id. slip op. at 1–2.
305. Id. slip op. at 8.
306. Id. slip op. at 29–31.
307. Id.
308. In a recent workshop held at the McGeorge School of Law titled “From Extraction to
Emancipation: Reimagining Development for Guatemala,” Dr. Yuri Melini, the Executive Director of
CALAS, the group that filed the claim, explained that the new Guatemalan President, Jimmy Morales,
will support mining companies and is likely to appoint to MEM, MARN, and the Constitutional Court
persons who will impede the faithful execution of the few “green” rulings of the Constitutional Court. Dr.
Yuri Melini, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Envtl., Legal, & Soc. Action of Guat., Keynote Address at Reimagining
Development for Guatemala Study Space Workshop (Dec. 4, 2015); see also Reimaging Development for
Guatemala
Study
Space
Workshop,
UNIV.
PAC,
https://calendar.pacific.edu/event/from_extraction_to_emancipation_reimagining_development_for_gua
temala?utm_campaign=widget&utm_medium=widget&utm_source=University+of+the+Pacific+%2F+
Sacramento#.VmYXruL_—d (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) (lecturing on lack of corporate responsibility
leading to environmental degradation in Guatemala).
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significant uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of FPIC. Unresolved
conflicts pertaining to non-renewable resources especially exacerbate this
uncertainty problem. There are three groups competing for rights related to
exploiting non-renewable resources: (1) the central government under its
exclusive constitutional authority to extract resources; (2) the localities under
decentralized forms of government to control their own natural resources and
territory; and (3) indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC under ILO Convention
169.
Guatemala’s failure to conduct local consultations following its own
legal procedures increases legal uncertainty. With some exceptions in a few
localities, the State refuses to engage in consultative processes.309 This
failure, in turn, causes mining corporations and those opposed to mining to
fill this void. Predictably, this process yields tremendous confusion and
uncertainty around the consultative process and renders the process legally
ineffective. The affected communities, which are largely opposed to mining,
question the legitimacy of consultative processes initiated by private
corporations.310 Likewise, mining corporations and the central government
often challenge the legality of local community-led consultation procedures
in subsequent litigation.
A helpful starting point in addressing this scenario is the existing legal
framework pertaining to indigenous peoples’ right to FPIC. This right is
distinct from consultation laws that apply to non-indigenous communities.
The principal reason for this distinction is that Guatemala ratified ILO
Convention 169 in 1996, a convention that applies only to indigenous and
tribal peoples and governs the consultative process.311 Moreover, Article 46
of Guatemala’s Constitution312 establishes the preeminence of international
human rights norms, which means ILO Convention 169 is not only a binding
convention, but a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed, in 1995,
Guatemala’s Constitutional Court issued an advisory opinion requested by
the Guatemalan Congress finding that ILO Convention 169 is a human rights

309. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 9 (describing how the Rapporteur struggled to get the
government to create a process that adequately consulted with the local indigenous peoples affected by
mines).
310. Id. at paras. 3233.
311. See Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples, supra note 232, at art. 6 (“In applying the
provisions of this Convention, governments shall: consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures . . . establish means by which these peoples can freely participate . . . [and] establish means
for the full development of these peoples own institutions . . . .”).
312. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 46.
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instrument as contemplated in Article 46 of the Guatemalan Constitution, and
that none of its provisions conflict with the Guatemalan Constitution.313
Guatemala enacted laws governing the consultative process, some of
which predate the country’s ratification of ILO 169, but there is a great deal
of uncertainty regarding these laws. The conflict lies in the laws’ hierarchical
value over other potentially conflicting norms, their normative vagueness,
and potential inconsistency with international obligations, at least in how
these laws pertain to indigenous peoples. Substantial non-implementation of
these laws is also a problem. This landscape provoked a chorus of
international governmental institutions to conclude that Guatemala is not
respecting indigenous peoples’ rights to FPIC.314
Before examining Guatemala’s domestic laws, the nature and scope of
ILO 169’s requirements must be considered. Article 6 of ILO 169 requires
states to consult “the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and
in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration
is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect
them directly.”315 This consultation shall be undertaken “in good faith and in
a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving
agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”316 The provision
implements procedural safeguards (by requiring the involvement of
representative institutions) to conduct consultative processes through
appropriate procedures.317 The institutions shall conduct the consultations in
good faith with the objective of reaching a substantive goal, consensus, to
safeguard indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.318
Under international law, the procedural and substantive goals of Article
6 mean that States must consult indigenous peoples to obtain their consent.319
Prior consent is actually required before a state can undertake activities or
measures that are likely to impact indigenous peoples’ rights over their lands
and natural resources.320 This consent goal includes development projects at
a grand scale likely to have a major impact on the physical and cultural
313. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] May 18, 1995, Opinión Consultiva,
Expediente Número. 199-95.
314. See Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 21 (discussing the conclusions of ILO, the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the Rapporteur that Guatemala is failing to comply with
the consultative process).
315. Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples, supra note 232, at art. 6(1)(a).
316. Id. at art. 6(2).
317. Anaya, supra note 124, at paras. 38–40.
318. Id.
319. Id. at para. 41.
320. Id.
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survival of indigenous peoples.321 Indeed, such projects require, as part of the
consultative requirements, commitments to execute environmental and social
impact assessments by independent and competent bodies, and a guarantee
that the affected indigenous peoples will receive a reasonable share of the
profits.322
Nevertheless, prior consent does not require a referendum process that
calls for a vote on development projects. Procedurally, Article 6
contemplates a process of dialogue and negotiation between the State and
indigenous communities, executed in good faith with the goal of reaching
consensus.323 While ideally the end result of this process is full agreement,
failure to reach such an outcome does not violate Article 6.324 Partial
agreement to key aspects can suffice, and sometimes the State can proceed
without reaching consensus.325 In such cases, however, the State bears the
burden of justifying why agreement was not possible, and the State is still
obligated to execute the project in ways that protect or repair any harms to
the substantive rights of indigenous peoples.326
Guatemala’s laws that seek to fulfill the consultation requirements in
metal mining projects do not conformprocedurally or substantivelyto
ILO 169. Procedurally, Guatemala’s laws contemplate an up-or-down
referendum process instead of meaningful dialogue and do not contemplate
environmental impact assessments or profit-sharing as part of the necessary
requirements.327 By ignoring overwhelming expressions of disapproval by
local communities attempting to engage in referenda, Guatemala is not acting
in good faith to achieve consensus. Many mining projects have violated the
substantive rights of indigenous peoples with little regard for amelioration or
reparations.
Several Guatemalan laws require consultation with local communities
on development projects. These laws, adopted in 2002, are the Law of the
Councils on Urban and Rural Development (Law of the Councils),328 the

321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 52.
323. Id. at para. 43.
324. Id. at para. 44.
325. Id.
326. Id. at paras. 45-47.
327. Id. at para. 45.
328. Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, Decreto Numero 11-2002, art. 26 (2002),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx11-2002.pdf.
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Municipal Code,329 and the General Law on Decentralization.330 These laws
establish a process for consulting with indigenous authorities, local
communities, or both. The Law of the Councils mirrors the constitutional
obligation to promote administrative, economic decentralization in order to
achieve adequate regional development of the country.331 The Law of the
Councils establishes the principal means by which Mayan, Xinca, Garífona,
and non-indigenous peoples of Guatemala can engage in democratic
participation in development projects, taking into account the country’s
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual characteristics.332 The Councils are formed at
five different levels of government: national, regional, departmental,
municipal, and community.333 In communities where there is indigenous
presence, the law explicitly requires participation of indigenous leaders
elected in accordance with the customary practices of each community.334
Councils are expected to work toward ensuring greater decentralization in
development decisions.335 Among the Councils’ principles are respecting
different Guatemalan cultures, promoting inter-cultural harmony, and
seeking balance between the environment and human development.336
Article 26 of this Law is the only provision expressly regulating
consultations, and it is limited to the participation of indigenous
communities.337 Moreover, the law appears to create solely a permissive—
not obligatory—procedural mechanism for consultation. It does not clarify
either procedural mechanisms or safeguards for participation, nor does it give
legal recognition or effect to the process.338 In this way, Article 26 does not
appear to conform to ILO Convention 169.
The General Law on Decentralization similarly contemplates ample
community participation in prioritizing public projects and distributing
329. Código Municipal de Guatemala, Decreto Numero 12-2002, art. 65 (2002),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx12-2002.pdf [hereinafter Municipal Code of
Guatemala].
330. Ley
General
de
Decentralización,
Decreto
Numero
14-2002
(2002),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2002/gtdcx14-2002.pdf.
331. Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, Decreto Numero 11-2002, pmbl. (citing
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 119(b), 224).
332. Id. at art. 1.
333. Id. at art. 4.
334. Id. at art. 23.
335. Id. at art. 8–14.
336. Id. at art. 26.
337. “Consultation with Indigenous Peoples. Until a law is passed that regulates consultation with
the Maya, Garífona and Xinca indigenous peoples with regard to development projects promoted by the
Executive Branch that affect directly these communities, consultation may be implemented by means of
the representatives in the development councils.” Id. (translation by author).
338. Id.
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public funds.339 The Law’s guiding principles include respect for municipal
sovereignty; the promotion of citizenship participation through dialogue and
negotiation; and the preservation of environmental equilibrium and human
development.340 The Law’s objectives include increasing local management
of a sustainable environment and reinforcing the identity and organization of
communities.341 Specifically for mining projects, Article 18 provides that
community organizations (recognized by law) shall participate in executing
public projects, programs, and services with the municipal authorities.342
Finally, the Municipal Code similarly promotes a decentralized
government, which is a response to the need to recognize Guatemala as a
multi-lingual and multi-cultural society.343 The Code gives municipalities the
ability to administer municipal funds––including the 0.5% royalties paid by
mining companies—preserves and promotes the cultural identity, and
protects renewable and non-renewable natural resources.344 The municipal
government is different from indigenous forms of government. In
Guatemala, indigenous leaders coexist parallel to the official leaders of the
municipality.345 Although the Municipal Code recognizes this coexistence, it
does not dictate a specific form of relationship; rather, the Code suggests that
the relationship be determined locally, and according to practice.346 The Code
expressly mentions indigenous, communitarian, and auxiliary municipal
forms of government.347 Furthermore, the Code states that the official
municipality must recognize and respect these governmental forms.348
Communitarian and auxiliary municipal forms of government, defined as
customary forms of local governance, are also charged with overseeing the
protection of renewable and non-renewable resources in their jurisdiction.349
In practice, the official municipal government receives and controls all local

339. Id. at art. 2.
340. Id. at art. 4.
341. Id. at art. 6.
342. Id. at art. 18.
343. Municipal Code of Guatemala, supra note 330, at pmbl.
344. Id. at art. 35.
345. See generally Carlos Fredy Ochoa, Trayectoria Histórica de las Alcaldías Indígenas
[Historical Trajectory of Indigenous Mayoralties], 28 MOMENTO, no. 4, 2013, at 3,
http://www.asies.org.gt/download.php?get=Momento-2013-4-Trayectoria-historica-de-las-alcadiasindigenas.pdf (providing examples of municipalities incorporating indigenous mayors as part of the
official local government).
346. Municipal Code of Guatemala, supra note 330, at art. 20–21.
347. Id. at art. 55–56.
348. Id.
349. Id. at art. 56, 58.
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public funds.350 Unfortunately, this Law does not resolve the frequent
conflicts between the official municipal governments and indigenous
leaders.351
Under the Municipal Code, seven separate provisions govern public
access to information and citizen participation. Article 60 generally charges
Municipal Councils with an obligation to provide information to the
community and facilitate its participation.352 Access to public information
under the Code pertains solely to municipal matters.353 The Municipal
Council decides by a two-thirds vote whether the issue before it merits a
consultative process.354 Alternatively, a minimum of 10% of registered
community voters may sign a petition to request a consultation.355 If 20%
have signed, the Municipal Council must implement it.356
Article 65 of the Municipal Code expressly codifies indigenous peoples’
right to consult. It provides that, when indigenous peoples’ interests and
rights are affected, the Municipal Council shall undertake a consultative
process at the request of the community or indigenous leaders.357 The process
includes adopting the customary laws and traditions of the indigenous
peoples.358 Therefore, the provision requires a consultative process upon the
request of indigenous communities and relies on procedures that conform to
local indigenous customs.
Article 66 governs consultation procedures and their legal effect.359 This
provision reiterates that the Municipal Council may fulfill its obligations
through an official ballot or in accordance with the community’s legal
norms.360 The results of the consultation are binding if at least 50% of eligible
voters in the municipality participate and the majority favors a particular
course of action.361 Thus, the Municipal Code provides indigenous

350. See generally CARLOS FREDY OCHOA, ALCALDÍAS INDÍGENAS: DIEZ AÑOS DESPUÉS DE SU
RECONOCIMIENTO POR EL ESTADO (2013), http://www.asies.org.gt/download.php?get=2013--disopalcald--as-ind--genas--diez-a--os-despu--s-de-su-reconocimiento-por-el-estado--tomo-i.pdf.
351. Id. at 32, 36 (discussing tension between indigenous mayors and official city public
officials).
352. Municipal Code of Guatemala, supra note 330.
353. Id. at art. 62.
354. Id. at art. 63.
355. Id. at art. 64.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at art. 66.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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communities with the ability to compel a binding, consultative process
according to their customs so long as a majority participates.
The Municipal Code leaves unresolved whether the consultative process
binds the Guatemalan central government, which has the exclusive power to
authorize mining licenses. Article 125 of the Guatemalan Constitution places
the decision of whether to exploit renewable and non-renewable resources
with the central government.362 Perhaps this explains why the 1997 Mining
Law does not address a consultative process. At most, the Mining Law’s
regulations contemplate the participation of affected communities through
interviews, surveys, workshops, assemblies, or working group meetings.363
This process, however, does not consider the cultural and socioeconomic
characteristics of the affected community.364 Even Guatemala’s
Constitutional Court found that the Mining Law fails to comply with
international norms.365
There have been either no consultations by the central government at
all––at least for early mining projects––or consultations have been less than
ideal with actors involved in mining conflicts.366 Civil groups opposing metal
mining have engaged in community-led referendum processes in
approximately 30 municipalities367 and the results overwhelmingly
demonstrate opposition to mining.368 These referenda consist of ballots with
362. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 125.
363. MARN Reglamento de Evalución, Control, y Seugimiento Ambiental, Acuerdo Gubernativo
Número 431-2007, at art. art. 74(b) (2007).
364. See Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 22.
365. See id. (citing Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] Dec. 21, 2009, Expediente
Número 3878–2007 (2007)).
366. Almost the entire population around the Marlin I mine, for example, was uninformed about
the project when exploitation began. VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 20.
367. ASOCIACIÓN DE INVESTIGACIÓN Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES, ESTUDIO DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA
SOBRE LA MINERÍA DE METALES EN GUATEMALA: INFORME DE RESULTADOS 5 (2010),
http://www.asies.org.gt/download.php?get=201007opinionmineriagtdice.pdf
[hereinafter
PUBLIC
OPINION STUDY]. See also VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 15–16 (discussing Sipacapa as a model used
by other local communities to organize their own consultation regarding mining operations).
368. See, e.g., ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 11; VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 44
(describing the 2005 community-led referendum process executed by the Municipality in Sipacapa in
which 98% of the 2,564 persons participating voted no to mining activities (the Marlin mine) in their
territory); see also PBI MINING BULLETIN, supra note 47, at 7 (discussing two community-led consultative
processes in the Quiché region,one in Ixcán in 2007 and another one in Cunén in 2009, with only the latter
conducted with the backing of the municipality and yielding a 100% vote to not allow mining with 58%
of all residents taking part). A 2010 public opinion survey conducted by the Association of Investigation
and Social Science also reports that 57% of the population living in mineral mining areas reject mining,
while people residing in rural sectors reject it at an even higher rate of 70%. PUBLIC OPINION STUDY,
supra note 368, at 7 fig.1, 9 fig.3. When one considers all development projects, including hydroelectric
plants and petroleum, the number of community-led consultative processes between 2005 and 2013 rises
to 73. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 14.
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broadly worded questions that ask for a vote on whether a specific project
should go forward, whether to exploit natural resources, or both questions.369
These processes are held with or without the municipality’s participation.
Whether consultation takes place usually depends on the local mayor’s
position toward mining.370 These processes are diverse and inconsistent in
terms of the actors who participate in the consultation.371
Mining companies respond to the conflicts generated by the lack of
consultation by starting their own dialogues. The companies hold voluntary
workshops that involve certain community members, military and police
representatives, and mining employees.372 In an attempt to generate this
dialogue between the State, the private sector, and communities, mining
companies support government initiatives that bypass the electoral
process.373 Members of civil society criticize these methods. First, they
question the legitimacy of those who represent the community. Second, they
argue that the purpose is largely to appease opposition with nominally
beneficial offers that do not address the looming problems that mining causes
in the communities.374
The Guatemalan Constitutional Court does not recognize these nongovernmental consultations as binding on MEM when issuing mining
licenses, even if the consultative process satisfies Municipal Code
procedures.375 In 2005, in a challenge filed by Montana Exploradora against
the consultation process executed in Sipacapa in accordance with a municipal
agreement, the Constitutional Court declared that the procedures followed
were not contrary to the Guatemalan Constitution.376 However, in 2007, the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court held that the central government had sole
369.
370.
371.
372.

PBI MINING BULLETIN, supra note 47, at 7.
See, e.g., id.
Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 48.
See, e.g., GOLDCORP, GOLDCORP’S SECOND UPDATE TO THE MARLIN MINE HUMAN RIGHTS
ASSESSMENT
REPORT
4
(2011),
http://www.goldcorp.com/files/docs_operations/Goldcorp_Response_to_Marlin_Mine_HRA_Report_U
pdate_04_29_2011_English.pdf (describing how Goldcorp and Montana are trying to improve
consultation and collaboration with the local communities by working with the Guatemalan government
to implement ILO 169).
373. Since 2010, Guatemala put in place a round table discussion initiative that involves the Vice
Presidency, MEM, MARN, other national government organizations, mayors, community representatives,
and mining companies to try to appease the conflicts generated by the Marlin I mine. Goldcorp has
expressed strong support for this initiative. Id. at 4–6.
374. See, e.g., Aldana, supra note 129, at 63–65 (demonstrating how Montana Exploradora
provided some benefits, yet overall denied environmental risks and harm to the community).
375. See VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 43–44 (discussing the 2005 judicial proceedings); Corte
de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] May 8, 2007, Expediente Número 1179-2005.
376. See VAN DE SANDT, supra note 60, at 44.
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jurisdiction to conduct consultative processes for projects involving
renewable resources.377 It further declared unconstitutional Article 27 of the
Municipal Act insofar as it bound the central government to the results of the
consultative process contrary to Article 125 of the Constitution, which grants
the central government sole authority over natural resources.378 In 2009, the
Constitutional Court again recognized the State’s duty to guarantee the
collective right of indigenous people to consultation but insisted that the
results of such consultation are non-binding.379 In nearly all of these rulings,
the Constitutional Court called on the Guatemalan Congress to enact a law
governing the consultative process.380 This implies that the Court does not
view the three laws promoting decentralization as relevant to this process.381
Between 2010 and 2011, Guatemala attempted but failed to adopt a
regulation governing the consultative process consistent with ILO 169.382
Not surprisingly, international bodies charged with overseeing the
consultative process under ILO 169 criticize Guatemala’s implementation.
In 2010, for example, the ILO and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights requested that Guatemala suspend operations of the Marlin I
mine due to inadequate consultations.383 In June 2010, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, called on the
Guatemalan government to adopt a law defining and assuring indigenous
peoples’ rights to consultation on resource development projects.384 Anaya,
however, emphasized the importance of Guatemalans moving beyond a
narrow focus on the binding nature of referendum results, and focusing
instead on the importance of adopting a more robust process that conforms
to the procedures and goals of ILO 169.385 Five years later, Guatemala
continues to operate the Marlin I mine while the consultative process remains
unchanged.

377. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] May 8, 2007, Expediente Número 11792005; see also Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 31.
378. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 45.
379. PBI MINING BULLETIN, supra note 47, at 5.
380. DUE PROCESS LAW FOUNDATION & OXFAM, DERECHO A LA CONSULTA Y AL
CONSENTIMIENTO PREVIO, LIBRE E INFORMADO EN AMÉRICA LATINA 32 (2015),
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/informe_consulta_previa_2015_web-2.pdf.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 33.
383. OAS Human Rights Comission Urges Suspension of Mining Activity at Goldcorp’s Marlin
Mine in Guatemala, MINING WATCH CAN. (May 24, 2010), http://miningwatch.ca/news/2010/5/24/oashuman-rights-commission-urges-suspension-mining-activity-goldcorps-marlin-mine.
384. Anaya, supra note 124, ¶ 88.
385. Id. ¶ 32.
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3. Property Rights
The Guatemalan mining regulatory regime is silent on several important
issues that pertain to property conflicts. Consequently, there is no regulation
or accountability over mining practices that affect property rights.
In contrast to countries like the United States,386 mineral rights in
Guatemala are severed. This means that private citizens or corporations own
surface rights while the central government retains all mineral rights under
Article 121 of the Guatemalan Constitution.387 Guatemalan law poorly
defines the relationship between the central government’s ownership of
mineral rights and the rights of indigenous peoples over communal lands. No
law in Guatemala proscribes mining in indigenous territory or on lands that
have a special cultural or spiritual significance to indigenous communities.388
In 2005, Guatemala adopted a cadastral law—a law to map out the country’s
land and real estate ownership.389 Unfortunately, this law does not consider
the historical record of land ownership or require consultation with
indigenous peoples.390 The Mining Law makes generous property
concessions to mining companies in terms of territory and access,391 and it
does not require the environmental impact study to consider the potential
impact on properties around the mine.392 If mining activities make it
impossible for local communities to remain in an area, no law contemplates
who should bear relocation costs or what practices should follow. At a
minimum, Article 16 of ILO 169 requires that, in the exceptional case when
indigenous peoples must be relocated, the State must guarantee their safe
return after addressing the reasons for their displacement.393
E. Mining Revenues and Public Spending
Guatemala’s existing legal framework lacks transparency and
accountability requirements for metal mining revenues. The Guatemalan
386. In the United States, the owner of surface rights also owns the right to minerals below the
surface. Denis Collins, The Failure of a Socially Responsive Gold Mining MNC in El Salvador:
Ramifications of NGO Mistrust, 88 J. B US . ETHICS 245, 252 (2009).
387. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 121.
388. Anaya, supra note 124, at para. 63.
389. Ley del Registro de Información Catastral, Decreto Número 41-2005, pmbl., art. 2 (2005),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2005/gtdcx41-2005.pdf.
390. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 20, 38.
391. The Mining Law contemplates an exploration mining concession of up to 3,000 km2, while
the entire country is barely over 100,000 km2. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 15.
392. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 20.
393. Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples, supra note 232, at art. 16(3).
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government has a history of collaborating with the private sector to rob
Guatemalans of their public funds.394 Indeed, Guatemala consistently scores
quite low on the Corruption Perception Index, ranking 115 out of 175
countries in 2014.395 In Guatemala, corruption is hard to fix because it is
systemic. The major factors contributing to corruption include outdated laws,
weak institutions, inadequate access to public information, limited public
participation, conflicts of interest, and impunity.396 Public expenditures in
Guatemala are particularly vulnerable to corruption because they are
dispersed through a system of trusteeships that involve poorly-regulated
committees comprised of public and private actors who lack transparency
and accountability.397 This means that the national and municipal
governments do not keep or make public records of total mine-related
royalties and taxes received, or how these revenues are spent.398
Addressing fiscal transparency in Guatemala is key to the country’s
democratic development. Fiscal transparency laws are weak and may require
constitutional amendment. Access to information is a constitutional
guarantee399 and Guatemala passed the Law on Access to Public Information
(LAPI) in 2008.400 But the Guatemalan Constitution and LAPI401 make it
illegal to publicly disclose the amount of taxes paid by any private individual
or corporate entity.402 As a result, all disclosures from the mining industry of

394. INSTITUTO CENTROAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES & OXFAM, LA CORRUPCIÓN: SUS
CAMINOS, SU IMPACTO EN LA SOCIEDAD Y UNA AGENDA PARA SU ELIMINACIÓN 7 (2015),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ints._la_corrupcion._sus_caminos_s
u_impacto_en_la_sociedad_y_una_agend.pdf [hereinafter ICEFI & OXFAM].
395. Guatemala’s score was 32 out of 100 in 2014, 29 out of 100 in 2013, and 34 out of 100 in
2013.
See
Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2014:
Results,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (last visited May 15, 2015).
396. ICEFI & OXFAM, supra note 395, at 13.
397. Id. at 22–23.
398. ZARSKY & STANLEY, supra note 40, at 28.
399. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 30–31.
400. Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública, Decreto Número 57-2008 (2008),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/2008/gtdcx57-0008.pdf.
401. Id. at art. 21–22.
402. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 31, 1985, art. 24. Article
24 reads in relevant part:
The books, documents, and records connected with the payment of taxes, rates,
charges, and levies can be revised by the competent authority in accordance with
the law. To disclose the amount of taxes paid, earnings, losses, expenses, and any
other data referring to audited accounts to individual or juridical persons, with the
exception of general balances, whose publication is mandated by law, is
punishable.
Id. (translation by author)
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taxes paid are discretionary and self-reported.403 In practice, the information
provided by the metal mining industry is too incomplete or piecemeal to be
helpful; transparency from the metal extractive industry in Guatemala is, in
fact, among the weakest in Latin America.404 Regulatory agencies exacerbate
this problem by failing to provide timely, public information about mining
that is clear , such as mining activities’ fiscal contributions.405 Since 2012,
the additional mining royalties have further concealed what happens with
mining money in Guatemala because these are not taxes collected by law.406
III. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR GUATEMALA’S METAL MINING
PROBLEM
This Part of the Article examines potential options for Guatemala to ban
future mining and manage ongoing mining concessions, including possibly
shutting down these operations under existing law. Guatemala has been
engaged in a process of reform for at least a decade without success.407
However, Guatemala did not start with reforms that banned mining, but
modified existing laws to continue mining operations. As discussed below,
this approach is not effective.408 A better alternative for Guatemala is to ban
metal mining. To support this proposal, this analysis reviews metal mining
bans in neighboring Central American countries and extracts potential
lessons for Guatemala. These countries have comparable economies, shared
histories, and similarities in some of the issues confronting mining; therefore,
these countries provide a compelling case for a potential metal mining ban in
Guatemala.

403. ICEFI & OXFAM, supra note 395, at 31.
404. Id. at 32.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 40.
407. See infra Part III.A.
408. This Article does not take a position on whether metal mining will always be bad for
Guatemalans; rather, it merely asserts that metal mining is an extremely detrimental activity for the
country at this moment in its history and that there are better mining models in the region for Guatemala
to emulate. One study, for example, views Chile as ahead of the curve, at least financially, in terms of the
share of gains it captures from mining and the degree to which it funds state spending through mining
operations. JUAN CARLOS GÓMEZ SABAÍNI ET AL., EL IMPACTO FISCAL DE LA EXPLOTACIÓN DE LOS
RECURSOS NATURALES NO RENOVABLES EN LOS PAÍSES DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE 5 (2015),
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38235/S1500128_es.pdf?sequence=1.
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A. Inadequacy of Mining Reforms in Guatemala to Date
Guatemala attempted to amend its mining laws 11 times in the past
decade alone.409 Moreover, on June 19, 2008, the Constitutional Court
declared seven articles of the 1997 Mining Law unconstitutional for failing
to comply with the Constitution’s environmental obligations.410 Specifically,
the Constitutional Court agreed with the Center for Environmental and Social
Legal Action (CALAS) that the Mining Law’s provision implying approval
from administrative inaction for longer than 30 days in response to an EIA
violated the State’s obligation to protect the environment.411 The
Constitutional Court also agreed that the Law’s failure to define or limit the
depth of exploitation permitted for mining also violated the State’s obligation
to protect the environment.412 Moreover, the Constitutional Court held that
the law’s permissiveness in allowing the release of contaminated waters from
mining activities violated the State’s obligation to protect the environment.413
Finally, the Constitutional Court held that requiring that mining operations
only mitigate waste and noise to the “extent possible” violated the State’s
obligation to protect the environment.414
In response to this holding, Guatemala imposed a moratorium on mining
until reforms to the Mining Law were adopted.415 Former President Otto
Pérez Molina and MEM presented the last set of reforms to Congress on
October 12, 2012.416 To date, Congress has not adopted these reforms.417 The
proposed reforms recognize that mining makes positive economic
contributions to Guatemala but also acknowledge several deficiencies in the
1997 laws that gave rise to conflict.418 One category of reforms focuses on
strengthening government institutions charged with implementing the
409. Yagenova, supra note 97, at 25.
410. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court] Apr. 1, 2008, Expediente 1491-2007,
Considerando § III (2007) (declaring article 19 of the Mining Law unconstitutional).
411. Id. (declaring article 19 of the Mining Law unconstitutional).
412. Id. at Considerando § IV (declaring articles 21, 24, and 27 of the Mining Law
unconstitutional).
413. Id. at Considerando § V (declaring article 75 of the Mining Law unconstitutional).
414. Id. at Considerando § VI (declaring article 81 of the Mining Law unconstitutional).
415. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
416. Iniciativa Que Dispone Aprobar Reformas al Decreto Número 48-97 del Congreso de la
República, Ley de Minería, Número de Registro 4590 at 2 (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.congreso.gob.gt/manager/images/99420C1A-337F-70CF-79EF-D05AD84E5BE3.pdf
[hereafter Bill to Amend Guatemala’s Mining Law].
417. The last reported action taken by Congress was finalizing public hearings on the proposed
law in September 2014. Finaliza Etapa de Audiencias Públicas para Reformas a la Ley de Minería,
CONGRESO REPUBLICA GUAT. (Sept. 17, 2014), www.congreso.gob.gt/noticias.php?id=6042.
418. Bill to Amend Guatemala’s Mining Law, supra note 417, at 4.
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Mining Law. For example, one of the identified deficiencies pertains to
MARN’s institutional weakness in enforcing environmental laws under the
1997 Mining Law. This law did not specifically grant MARN authority to
apply the Improvement and Protection of the Environment Law to mining
activities.419 The proposed reform simply includes a new provision explicitly
demanding that MARN monitor environmental compliance prior to resource
extraction, but it fails to specify how early and in what capacity.420 It also
fails to instruct how to resolve conflicts between the decisions of MEM and
MARN.
A second category of reforms focuses on social aspects by proposing
improved communications between MEM and the Municipal Development
Councils.421 For example, MEM should hold a meeting in person with the
Municipal Council to explain––in a culturally appropriate way––the
environmental and technical aspects of a mining project compared to its
economic benefits.422 These meetings should not replace the ILO 169
consultative process.423 These reforms also create a broad principle of
corporate social responsibility, and requires periodic health assessments for
the mine.424 A separate provision permits the State to create public mining
companies and declares, in absolute terms, that the State exclusively holds
the property rights to any substance found in the subsoil.425 This provision
does not attempt to clarify how property rights in the subsoil relate to surface
property rights. For example, it does not address what should happen when
the surface property belongs to an indigenous community’s ancestral lands
or is located in a similarly protected area.
Another important section fills some gaps from the 1997 Mining Law
by addressing mining’s effect on the environment. For example, it requires
closing the mine to restore affected areas to the land’s original state or to an
alternative state––so long as the community can productively use the land.426
The reforms also contemplate the need for a plan that monitors water use and
contamination resulting from mining activities.427 Finally, there are
provisions related to taxes and royalties.428 The reforms would no longer
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
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exempt mining companies from taxes; instead, royalties would increase from
1% to a variable system that depends on the type of mineral being mined.429
Under this system, royalty payments for precious metals would increase to
5%.430 The law also contemplates that 55% of the royalties would go to local
communities and be invested in sustainable projects beyond the life of the
mine.431 A United States State Department report noted that “[o]n November
28, 2014, however, the Guatemalan Congress passed the 2015 national
budget that increases royalties from 1 to 10% on most private mining
operations,” 90% of which would go to the central government and only 10%
to the municipalities.432 Investors are challenging the legality of this
change.433
If adopted, some of the proposed changes to the Mining Law would be
an improvement from the status quo. However, they are neither sufficient nor
likely to be well-executed. The reforms fail to address critical issues, such as
meaningful decisionmaking, economic participation by local communities,
and reforms to public spending laws and policies. Second, the proposed
reforms depend on political will to produce change, such as significantly
increasing MARN’s resources to enable the agency to do its job. Third, these
reforms will be meaningless when applied to Guatemala’s weak democracy.
To enhance accountability, Guatemala must strengthen its democratic
institutions and entities charged with enforcing environmental laws, and
improve public participation in the democratic process. These types of
changes require long-term, systemic reforms. Guatemala is simply not ready
for metal mining.
B. Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala: A Comparative Assessment of
Domestic Law and International Liability
1. Banning Future Metal Mining
In Central America, three countries—Costa Rica, Honduras, and El
Salvador—imposed restrictions on future mining in their territories.434 The
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 13.
432. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 5 (2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241790.pdf [hereinafter GUATEMALA INVESTMENT
STATEMENT].
433. Id.
434. EQUIPO REGIONAL DE MONITOREO Y DE ANÁLISIS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN
CENTROAMÉRICA, INFORME SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOs Y CONFLICTIVIDAD EN CENTROAMÉRICA
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moratoriums on mining in Honduras and El Salvador, however, are ad hoc
and temporary, similar to the moratorium Guatemala has already attempted.
Citing water contamination and other environmental concerns,435 El
Salvador’s former President Antonio Saca imposed a moratorium on mining
in 2008, which three subsequent administrations followed.436 The ad hoc
nature of El Salvador’s ban means the nature, scope, and temporal parameters
of the ban are unknown; however, El Salvador is still attempting to ban
mining.437 Similarly, in Honduras, the mining sector had been closed to new
investment since 2005 after the country’s Supreme Court struck down
portions of its 1999 Mining Law.438 However, Honduras lifted the ban in
2014 after adopting a new mining law in 2013.439 Unfortunately, the lift of
the ban, as in Guatemala, renewed and intensified ongoing social conflicts
around mining.440 In contrast, Costa Rica passed a law that delineates the
parameters of its permanent mining ban.441 Accordingly, this Article looks to
Costa Rica as a model.
a. Nature and Scope: Costa Rica as a Model
Costa Rica’s democratic stability during Central America’s civil wars
made the country an early target of mining investment.442 Canadian and
United States companies became involved in a number of gold and silver
2013–2014, at 47–48 (2014), http://www.fespad.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Dddhh20141.pdf. In
contrast, Nicaragua, the largest producer of gold in Central America, and Panama, predicted to become a
major copper-exporting country, have increased mining in recent years. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL
INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 34.
435. Despite the moratorium, water contamination problems from mining persist. In 2012, tests
completed by El Salvador’s Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources revealed high
concentrations of cyanide and iron at a location in the San Sebastian River, which flows by the site of the
San Sebastian gold mine. The agency also reported that approximately 25% of the community lacked
access to safe drinking water. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at
35.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 100.
438. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HONDURAS INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2014, at 3 (2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230898.pdf.
439. Jennifer Moore, No Small Coup: The Honduras Free Trade Agreement, RABBLE.CA (July
14, 2014), http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/miningwatch/2014/07/no-small-coup-canada-honduras-freetrade-agreement.
440. Id.
441. Código de Minería, Decreta No. 6769, art. 8 (Aug. 23, 1982) (Costa Rica),
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cos67718.pdf, amended by Ley para declarar a Costa Rica País Libre de
Minería Metálica a Cielo Abierto, Decreta No. 8904, art. 1, (Nov. 9, 2010) (Costa Rica),
http://www.imprenal.go.cr/pub/2011/02/10/alca11.pdf.
442. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 38.
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exploration and mining operations.443 Beginning in the 1990s, however,
Costa Rica became a focal point for the international environmental
movement, which challenged the viability of mining operations in the
country.444 This anti-mining resistance ultimately affected gold exploration
and development in the country.445 National gold production has virtually
disappeared since 2001, mainly due to low international prices and increased
mine operating costs from stricter regulations, which made mining
unprofitable.446 Costa Rica also discouraged mining by enacting a
moratorium and underfunding the agencies charged with approving mining
concessions, which made mining investment too risky.447 Ultimately, the
Costa Rican government permanently banned certain types of mining.
Today, mining investment in Costa Rica is practically zero.448
Citing environmental concerns, Costa Rica became the first country in
Latin America to ban open-pit mining in November 2010.449 The effort to
implement a mining ban in the country started in 2002, with President Abel
Pacheco signing a ban on new open-pit mining.450 However, in 2008, the
President and his Environment and Energy Minister were under criminal
investigation for issuing a permit to a local subsidiary of a Canadian mining
company, Infinito Gold, to develop “a $66 million open-pit gold mine in the
fragile ecosystem of the Cerro Crucitas.”451 The government granted a permit
to Infinito to clear approximately 500 acres of old-growth rainforest.452
Moreover, two endangered species, the almendro amarillo (yellow almond)
tree and the Great Green Macaw, reside in this area.453 Former President
Oscar Arias and his Environment and Energy Minister, Roberto Dobles could
be held liable for “knowingly approving the clear-cutting of the almendro
trees (Dipteryxpanamensis), and . . . destroying the habitat of the green

443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 52.
447. Id. at 53.
448. Id.
449. Law Makers Ban Open Pit Mining, LATIN AMERICA PRESS (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.lapress.org/articles.asp?item=1&art=6269.
450. Costa Rica Bans Open Pit Mining, EARTHJUSTICE (June 7, 2002),
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2002/costa-rica-bans-open-pit-mining.
451. Zach Dyer, Costa Rica: From ‘Green’ to Gold?, NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN
AMERICA (Dec. 26, 2008), https://nacla.org/news/costa-rica-green-gold.
452. Id.
453. Id.
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macaw (Araambigua).”454 Infinito is also under investigation for illegally
cutting trees and encroaching on protected areas.455
The proposed gold mine threatened to tarnish Costa Rica’s image as a
haven for ecotourism.456 The mine also poses serious threats to public health
and the environment.457 Moreover, mining has been insignificant in the
national economy of Costa Rica, contributing only 0.10.2% of the country’s
GDP annually from 2008 to 2012.458 For these reasons, Costa Rica decided
that “tourism’s long-term economic gains would be more sustainable than
the timber and precious metals industries in the country.”459 Costa Rica’s
national park system is among the most extensive in Latin America.460 It
includes nearly 4% of the country’s total land area and has 12 parks, 6 nature
reserves, 4 recreation areas, and several habitat and wildlife areas.461 In
addition, 23% of Costa Rica’s total land area is protected from all forms of
mining.462 Finally, Costa Rica is widely recognized as the safest country in
the region for travelers, which has helped increase its popularity as a vacation
destination.463
Shortly after taking office in May 2010, President Laura Chinchilla
issued a decree banning new open-pit mining contracts in the country, but
indicated that she would allow the courts to determine whether the Crucitas
mine would be allowed to proceed.464 Costa Rica banned cyanide leaching
mining because it was perceivedthough not proventhat inadequate
regulation of cyanide leaching facilities was causing significant
environmental degradation.465 The mining industry and interested companies
have challenged the validity of the mining ban on various constitutional
grounds.466
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 34.
459. Costa Rica Gold Mining History and Current Ban, RAREGOLDNUGGETS.COM (July 30,
2015), http://raregoldnuggets.com/blog/?p=1566.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Law Makers Ban Open Pit Mining, supra note 450.
465. Jan G. Laitos, Cyanide, Mining, and the Environment, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 869, 911
(2013).
466. Casey Dawson, Why Honduras Should Not Jump on the Ban Wagon: A Study of Open Pit
Mining Bans and Their Pitfalls, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 67, 85 (2014). For a helpful discussion
of the history of the approval and implementation of Costa Rica’s open-pit gold mining ban, see generally
Eugenia Wo Ching, The First Latin American Country Free of Open–Pit Gold Mining, in THE EARTH
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Although seemingly ambitious, Costa Rica’s mining ban is consistent
with bans in other domestic and international environmental law contexts.
Ample precedent exists for prioritizing environmental conservation goals
over economic gains in contexts ranging from regulation of the atmosphere
to management of the oceans. Bans on economically lucrative, but
environmentally destructive practices first appeared in the marine law
context. One of the earliest examples is the moratorium on commercial
whaling under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW).467 Commercial whaling was highly lucrative because of high market
demand for whale products, which pushed many whale species to the brink
of extinction. The moratorium was initially intended to be temporary, but has
remained in effect for decades with very limited exceptions.468 Other bans on
lucrative yet destructive marine practices include national and subnational
bans on shark finning469 and bans on the use of driftnets on the high seas.470
A successful ban of an environmentally destructive practice also exists
in the atmospheric protection context. A well-known example is the ban of
stratospheric ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) under the
Montreal Protocol, which began in the late 1980s.471 CFCs are chemicals
used in the production of air conditioning and refrigeration that were linked
to depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, which is essential to protect
biological life from the sun’s harmful UV-B rays.472 In response to this
challenge, the international community developed and implemented one of
the most successful environmental treaties, which phased out CFCs and
replaced them with ozone-friendly alternatives.473

CHARTER, ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 216, 228 (Laura Westra & Mirian Vilela
eds., 2014).
467. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
161 U.N.T.S. 72, 74 (organizing a league of nations to regulate the whaling industry).
468. The two exceptions under the ICRW are: (1) scientific research and (2) aboriginal
subsistence.
469. See, e.g., Shark Conservation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-348, 124 Stat. 3668
§ 102(a)(1)(C) (2011) (prohibiting the removal of shark fins); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2021 (West
2016).
470. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, Nov. 24,
1989, 1899 U.N.T.S. 1. (also referred to as the “Wellington Convention”).
471. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, T.I.A.S. No.
11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 323.
472. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 567 (3d ed.
2007).
473. See Ian Rae, Saving the Ozone Layer: Why the Montreal Protocol Worked, CONVERSATION
(Sept. 9, 2012), https://theconversation.com/saving-the-ozone-layer-why-the-montreal-protocol-worked9249 (explaining the Montreal Protocol and the reasons for its success).
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Consequently, Costa Rica’s metal mining ban and the proposed
Guatemalan ban draw support from these marine and atmospheric success
stories. The proposed Guatemalan ban is even more compelling than these
examples because of the extensive property and social impacts involved.
b. Assessing Costs
Guatemala’s decision to ban mining would result in some costs for the
country. Mining revenues are significant for Guatemala,474 a country
experiencing a fiscal deficit due to a weak tax regime and corruption.475 If
Guatemala’s Mining Law were reformed to increase royalties, these revenues
could be even greater. Although there are other indirect economic gains from
mining,476 mining’s environmental and social costs overshadow them.477
Guatemala cannot simply ignore these costs when assessing mining’s fiscal
benefits, especially when those most harmed by the activity are not the
beneficiaries of its revenue. Guatemala will not benefit from mining until it
adopts a law that accurately accounts for mining’s environmental and social
costs. Moreover, Guatemala needs to address the distributional unfairness of
the existing mining regime. Guatemala must first reform the mining industry
so that its economic benefits flow to those communities most negatively
affected. Finally, Guatemala has options to make up the fiscal impact from
lost mining revenues. Such options could include: reengaging comprehensive
tax reforms that also tackle fiscal mismanagement and transparency;478
effectively capitalizing on remittances that Guatemalan emigrants send to the

474. See supra Part II.E (explaining how the lack of transparency and accountability requirements
for mining revenues enable corruption in Guatemalan government).
475. ESTUDIO ECONÓMICO DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, GUATEMALA 2 (2015) [hereinafter
CEPAL
ECONOMIC
REPORT],
http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38713/Guatemala_es.pdf?sequence=65 (estimating a
2% fiscal deficit for Guatemala).
476. See supra Part I.C (comparing mining costs with social and environmental costs).
477. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining mining’s environmental and health impacts).
478. Guatemala has always collected few taxes compared to other Latin American countries and
its investment is extremely low in social programs. In 2012, the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean and Spain produced an in-depth study of the tax reforms that Guatemala put in place
that year. The report concludes that while the reforms moved in a positive direction, they did not achieve
sufficient gains because Guatemala continues to lose revenues to corruption, did not engage in
administrative reforms necessary to improve the collection of taxes, and also adopted regressive tax
policies that failed to sufficiently tax the private sector. See generally MAYNOR CABRERA, ANÁLISIS DE
IMPLEMENTACIÓN
DE
LA
REFORMA
TRIBUTARIA
DE
GUATEMALA
(2012),
LA
http://www.cepal.org/ofilac/noticias/paginas/3/43813/Documento_15_Guatemala.pdf.
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country;479 and encouraging the development of industries with great
potential, such as ecotourism.
Another potential economic impact from a ban is a reduction in foreign
direct investment (FDI). But concern about this impact is probably
misplaced. As in other Central American countries,480 low FDI can be
attributed to other factors including: confusing laws and regulations, an
ineffective judiciary, bureaucratic impediments, undeveloped human capital,
political instability, corruption, and widespread crime.481 Indeed, economists
estimate that Guatemala’s recent corruption scandals are likely to impede the
steady economic growth of the country, particularly by reducing FDI.482
Moreover, Costa Rica’s FDI has not suffered as a result of its ban on mining.
Even after the ban, Costa Rica continues to be a popular destination for
investment with a record to prove it.483 Further, Guatemala has better FDI
options than mining. Currently, Guatemala’s FDI is principally focused on
mining and energy infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture.484 Yet
Guatemala has great potential for economic development through
ecotourism, for example.485
479. In contrast to mining, the contribution to Guatemala’s GDP from remittances is substantial:
9.4%, or $5.5 million, in 2014 alone, a number that is projected to increase. CEPAL ECONOMIC REPORT,
supra note 476, at 4. Other countries, including Mexico, have instituted effective programs to encourage
local development. See, e.g., Martin Chavez, Remittances and the Charitable Deduction: A New Approach
to Encouraging Development in Mexico, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEG . & P UB. P OL ’Y 565, 601–02 (2011)
(discussing the benefits of remittances for developing countries); Laura L. Norris, The Revolving Door of
Emigration: The Economic Influence of Remittances in Developing Countries, 31 N W . J. INT ’L L. &
B US. 479, 479–80 (2011) (emphasizing the significance of remittances in developing countries); Pablo
Acosta et al., Remittances and Development in Latin America, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 957 (2006).
480. According to the State Department, for example, El Salvador’s low foreign investment
numbers are attributable to political uncertainty, inconsistent and burdensome commercial regulations, an
ineffective judicial system, and violent crime. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT
CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 3 (2015), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241758.pdf.
Nicaragua’s low FDI numbers are attributable to the country’s weak judicial system, land titling issues,
and corruption. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NICARAGUA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 3 (2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241895.pdf. Honduras’s low FDI is due to high levels of
crime, a weak judicial system, corruption, low educational levels, and poor infrastructure. U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE,
HONDURAS
INVESTMENT
CLIMATE
STATEMENT
2015,
at
3
(2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241799.pdf.
481. GUATEMALA INVESTMENT STATEMENT, supra note 433, at 3.
482. CEPAL ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 476, at 1.
483. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COSTA RICA INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 2015, at 3 (2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241737.pdf.
484. GUATEMALA INVESTMENT STATEMENT, supra note 433, at 3.
485. Ecotourism, if managed properly, can even be an important conservation tool for developing
nations. Christina M. Argueta, Mending Guatemala’s Tourism Industry Through Private Regulation, 89
N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1381, 1407–08 (2014); Tim Wallace & Daniela N. Diamente, Keeping People in the
Parks: A Case Study from Guatemala, 23 NAPA B ULL . 191 (2005). See also LAURA DRISCOLL ET AL.,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE TRAVEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF ECOTOURISM AS A DEVELOPMENT AND
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Finally, a mining ban—depending on its scope—may cost Guatemala
millions in arbitration costs. At a minimum, companies with an exploration
mining license could attempt to sue Guatemala in the same way they have
sued the government of El Salvador.486 Canada’s Pacific Rim Mining
Corporation filed an arbitration complaint against El Salvador through the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and
sought damages of more than $77 million it claimed to have invested in El
Salvador since 2002, primarily in its El Dorado gold project.487 Initially the
ICSID dismissed the case because Pacific Rim attempted to use a United
States subsidiary to file a Central American Free Trade Agreement claim;
however, the complaint proceeded under El Salvador’s domestic investment
law, which allows arbitration of disputes with foreign investors.488 Pacific
Rim, which only holds an exploration license, alleged nonetheless that El
Salvador’s refusal to grant environmental permits was unjustified.489
2. Shutting Down Current Metal Mining
This Part will focus on shutting down mining concessions that are in
operation, either in the exploration or exploitation stages. Mining exploration
CONSERVATION
TOOL
IN
THE
OSA
PENINSULA,
COSTA
RICA
(2011),
http://www.responsibletravel.org/resources/documents/reports/tinker_final_report_master.pdf
(concluding that ecotourism in the Osa represents a different, and better, form of development than the
existing extractive alternatives).
486. Two international arbitration claims have been filed by mining companies against El
Salvador before the ICSID for the country’s decision to shut down mining operations, but only the one
filed by Pacific Rim is pending. The ICSID dismissed the other claim filed by Commerce Group Corp.
and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. in 2011 based on their failure to comply with CAFTA’s waiver
provisions. Commerce Group Corp. et al. v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17,
Award (Mar. 14, 2011). The claimants sought to annul the 2011 judgment, but the proceedings were
closed in 2013 due to the claimants’ non-payment of filing fees. Commerce Group Corp. et al. v. The
Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Order of the Committee Discontinuing the
Proceedings and Decision on Costs (Aug. 23, 2013). While this judgment represented a victory for the
Salvadoran government, the decision is solely procedural and not a decision on the merits.
487. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 35. See also
Collins, supra note 387, at 253–62 (reviewing the facts and events of the Pacific Rim El Dorado project
EIA process).
488. CENTRAL AMERICAN MINERAL INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 35. Article 15 of
El Salvador’s Investment Law, however, limits a foreign investor’s access to international dispute
resolution and may obligate them to use national courts, but only if the foreigner comes from a country
without a preexisting trade agreement with El Salvador. EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT STATEMENT 2015,
supra note 481, at 10. Canada does not currently have a trade agreement with El Salvador. See CanadaGuatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador (Formerly Canada – Central American Four) Free Trade
Agreement Negotiations, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/honduras/ca4.aspx?lang=eng (last visited May 16, 2016).
489. EL SALVADOR INVESTMENT STATEMENT 2015, supra note 481, at 9.
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can take years and usually involves significant investment.490 Exploring
minerals, for example, requires companies to acquire surface property rights
and to drill with expensive equipment.491 Once the mine is in full operation,
the investment is even greater because it requires, among other expenses,
purchasing expensive equipment, building infrastructure, and hiring
employees. Mining companies that must shut down existing mining
operations undoubtedly face significant investment losses. Companies may
claim lost revenue from unmined minerals. Therefore, this Part explores
whether these companies may seek an expropriation claim in an international
arbitration. If so, the next issue is how to determine just compensation under
these circumstances.
International arbitration claims against developing nations threaten the
adoption of more sustainable mining policies. According to a recent report
by the Institute for Policy Studies, of the 169 cases pending at the ICSID, 60
involved mining or hydrocarbons extraction and half of these disputes arose
in Latin America.492 This Part proposes how Guatemala could carefully
proceed to ban current mining operations while minimizing investor liability.
To draw lessons for Guatemala, this Part examines both Guatemala’s
investor rights regime and the expropriation claims pending before
international tribunals against El Salvador and Costa Rica. Finally, this Part
recommends how Guatemala’s existing environmental regime could ban
current mining projects while reducing the specter of mining company
compensation.
a. Guatemala’s Investor Rights Regime
Guatemala’s regime protecting FDI assets and interests, as well as the
resolution of disputes involving FDI claims, is quite favorable toward foreign
investors. In 1998, Guatemala adopted the Foreign Investment Law, which
eliminated trade-related investment restrictions to ensure that it was
compliant with the World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations under the
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).493 Guatemala
is also a party to 11 free trade agreements (FTAs), including the CAFTA490. For example, Pacific Rim in El Salvador alleges that its investment had been $77 million
over a period of about six years between 2002 and 2008. See Collins, supra note 387, at 260.
491. Id. at 252.
492. SARAH ANDERSON & MANUEL PÉREZ-ROCHA, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, EXTRAYENDO
GANANCIAS EN TRIBUNALES INTERNACIONALES
1
(2013),
http://www.ips-dc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Mining-for-Profits-2013-SPANISH.pdf.
493. Ley de
Inversión Extranjera, Decreto Número
9-98 (1998) (Guat.),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1998/gtdcx09-1998.pdf.
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DR, which covers the Central American region, the Dominican Republic, and
the United States.494 Guatemala also has 15 bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) in force.495 The country does not, however, have either an FTA or a
BIT with Canada.496 Collectively, these instruments have created a number
of important substantive and procedural foreign investor rights. Foreign
investor rights include the right to establish, acquire, and operate an
investment in Guatemala on par with local investors, and the right to receive
fair market value for property in the case of expropriation.497
Under Guatemala’s Foreign Investment Law and a number of
international agreements, foreign investors have the right to resolve disputes
against the country in an international arbitration process.498 For example,
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10 contemplates resolution of investor suits against a
state through the World Bank’s ICSID or the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).499 Guatemala’s Arbitration Law of
1995 uses UNCITRAL’s Model Law as the basis for its rules on international
arbitration.500 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards—to which Guatemala is a signatory—enforces
foreign arbitral awards.501 In addition, Guatemala is a party to the InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama
Convention).502

494. See List of Guatemala’s International Investment Agreements, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON
TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/86#iiaInnerMenu (last
visited May 16, 2015).
495. See id. (listing Guatemala’s bilateral investment treaties).
496. In 1998, Canada, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Investment to work toward adopting a regional trade
agreement. See Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Investment (MOUTI) (Mar. 18, 1998),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2478. To date, however, this has not
happened.
497. List of Guatemala’s International Investment Agreements, supra note 495.
498. David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican RepublicUnited States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 374 (2007).
499. Id. at 368.
500. Ley de Arbitraje, Decreto
Número 67-95 (Oct. 3, 1995) (Guat.),
http://old.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/decretos/1995/gtdcx67-1995.pdf; Iniciativa que Dispone Aprobar
Reformas al Decreto Número 67-95 del Congreso de la Repúublica, Ley de Arbitraje, Número de Registro
4802 (Jan. 30, 2014) (Guat.), http://www.congreso.gob.gt/manager/images/3A8FC4D1-11BB-34AAD283-1C7E8DDC29F3.pdf.
501. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, June
7, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; List of Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/list+of+contracting+states (last visited May 16, 2016).
502. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 1989.
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Guatemala’s liberalizing trend in trade and investment law, however,
still recognizes the State’s important role in protecting human, animal, and
plant health. Some of Guatemala’s international trade or investment
agreements contain, for example, environmental provisions that require
Guatemala to ensure that investors do not undermine preexisting
environmental obligations through development.503 CAFTA-DR is the most
important example of this type of regime. For example, its preamble instructs
parties to “implement th[e] Agreement in a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation, promote sustainable
development and strengthen their cooperation on environmental matters.”504
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 17 also promotes environmental protections as part
of trade and investment.505 Article 17.2.2 recognizes that “it is inappropriate
to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the protections
afforded in environmental laws.”506 In addition, Article 17.3.1 creates an
obligation on each Party to “ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative proceedings, in accordance with its law, are available to
sanction or remedy violation of its environmental laws.”507 Article 17.13.1
defines environmental law as “any statute or regulation . . . or provision . . .
the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the
prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health.”508 It does
not, however, include “any statute, regulation, or provision thereof, the
primary purpose of which is managing the commercial harvest or
exploitation . . . of natural resources.”509 Thus, foreign investors must accept
the regulatory regime in which they invest and include this factor into their
economic assessment of the investment project.510

503. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement pmbl., Aug. 5,
2004 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR], http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/cafta/caftadr_e/CAFTADRinpdf_e.asp.
504. Id.
505. Id. at art. 17.2.
506. Id. at art. 17.2.2.
507. Id. at art. 17.3.1. Chapter 17 also allows citizens to file a submission that asserts that a Party
is failing to enforce its environmental laws effectively. See Note, Vivian H.W. Wang, Investor Protection
or Environmental Protection? “Green” Development Under CAFTA, 32 C OLUM . J. ENVTL . L. 251, 272
(2007) (discussing the Chapter 17 enforcement provisions).
508. CAFTA-DR, supra note 504, at art. 17.13.1.
509. Id. This definitional limitation opens up ambiguities and tensions around what “primary
purpose” means—whether the primary purpose of a law is commercial regulation or environmental
protection. Wang, supra note 508, at 277–80. In Guatemala’s case, however, if the mines are shut down
not to continue operations by the government but to repair and prevent further environmental damage,
this should not be an issue.
510. Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT ’ L & C OMP . L.Q. 811, 819 (2001).
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b. Closure of the Mines and Claims of Expropriation: El Salvador and
Costa Rica as Precursors
Guatemala has a poor record with international arbitration claims with
losses in the millions of dollars.511 Guatemala should be concerned about
liability from investor lawsuits were it to decide to shut down current mining
projects. Guatemala, however, would not be alone. Two other Central
American countries—El Salvador and Costa Rica—have opted to shut down
ongoing mining operations in their respective countries.512
El Salvador’s moratorium on mining affected Pacific Rim’s exploration
license; the company’s shares dropped 30% following the moratorium.513 In
2013, Pacific Rim sold its shares to OceanaGold, an Australian mining
company.514 By then, Pacific Rim had already filed an arbitration complaint
with ICSID, alleging damages of over $300 million.515 Pacific Rim contends,
in a pending complaint, that it relied on El Salvador’s assurances that a
mining license could be obtained for the property.516 In 2004, Pacific Rim
submitted the initial environmental permit application to El Salvador’s
environmental protection agency.517 But the application became embroiled in
significant social unrest arising from opposition to the mine based on
environmental concerns.518
Despite strong and growing opposition to the mine, and an
environmental impact report that questioned Pacific Rim’s own EIA,519 El
Salvador’s environmental protection agency granted preliminary approval
for a mining permit for Pacific Rim to operate the El Dorado mine in the
neighboring Cabanas province in 2006.520 This approval depended on a final
EIA report that responded to concerns raised by the agency and community
511. For example, in the last decade alone, Guatemala has lost two important investment disputes
involving American businesses filed in 2007 and 2010. The 2010 claim, which involved an allegation of
expropriation based on Guatemala’s regulation of electricity rates, resulted in an award of $21 million in
damages and $7.5 million in legal expenses against the government of Guatemala. The appeal for this
award is still pending. GUATEMALA INVESTMENT STATEMENT 2015, supra note 433, at 910.
512. Dawson, supra note 467, at 85; Collins, supra note 387, at 245.
513. Collins, supra note 387, at 245.
514. Dawson, supra note 467, at 85.
515. Id.
516. Collins, supra note 387, at 253.
517. Id. at 256–62.
518. Id.
519. The report, funded by Oxfam, the Anglican Church, and several other organizations, solicited
Robert Moran of Michael-Moran Associates to assess Pacific Rim’s EIA. The Moran report expressed
many concerns, including the impact of the mining activity on the Rio Lempa, mining explosions that
damaged homes and caused landslides, and mining trucks that restricted highway access. Id. at 256.
520. Id. at 257.

2016]

Banning Metal Mining in Guatemala

663

groups.521 According to Salvadoran law, the agency had 2–4 months to either
deny or accept Pacific Rim’s mining license application; however, this never
happened.522 Instead, ongoing protests and unrest led then-President Saca to
order the agency not to issue any new mining permits in 2006, a moratorium
that continues today.523 Ultimately, Pacific Rim suspended all of its mining
operations in 2008, and blamed its financial demise on the 2009 presidential
elections, during which candidates targeted the mining project to gain
votes.524
For its part, in a domestic judicial proceeding, Costa Rica shut down San
Carlos’s Crucitas mine.525 In 2010, Infinito Gold lost its mining concession
when a Costa Rican judge found irregularities and environmental harms
resulting from the operation of the mine, including illegal deforestation.526
Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica permanently annulled the
concession and applied Costa Rica’s new ban on surface or open-pit mining
to this mining project.527 As a result, Infinito Gold alleged that it lost $93.9
million directly and another $1 billion in potential future profit in a complaint
filed with ICSID.528
There are important lessons for Guatemala from the experiences of these
two countries. In El Salvador, the normal legal process for considering
whether to grant an exploration license was not followed. Rather, these
processes were interrupted by social unrest such that the country’s
environmental protection agency never issued a final decision on whether to
grant the mining concession. These disruptions to the process should not,
however, minimize the significant environmental problems that the mine
posed for El Salvador. The mine would draw water from El Salvador’s
Lempa River.529 The Lempa is El Salvador’s largest river and one of the few
remaining uncontaminated sources of water in the country on which more
than three million Salvadorans rely each day for drinking, farming, fishing,
supporting livestock, and hydroelectric power.530 The El Dorado mine is a
521. Id.
522. Id. at 258.
523. Id. at 259.
524. Id. Ironically, President Saca was from the conservative ARENA party, which had supported
laws and practices that opened the country to mining in the first place.
525. Dawson, supra note 467, at 84–85.
526. ANDERSON & PÉREZ-ROCHA, supra note 493, at 16.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Emily Achtenberg, Resistance to Mining in El Salvador: A Battle for Water, Life, and
National Sovereignty, REVISTA, Winter 2014, at 62, http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/resistancemining-el-salvador.
530. Id.
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significant threat to rural economies and local drinking water supplies
because it is likely to deplete and contaminate water through a waterintensive cyanide ore process.531
The ICSID may dismiss the Pacific Rim claim if it does not recognize
OceanaGold’s status as an American company.532 However, if the case
proceeds, the procedural irregularities expose El Salvador to potential
liability. Given the highly technical nature of EIAs in mining projects, the
arbitration tribunal will not conduct its own EIA but will either defer to the
technical environmental findings of the Salvadoran government or actually
examine the validity of those findings.533 Yet, El Salvador likely lacks
official domestic documentation of the negative environmental impacts from
the Pacific Rim to the Lempa River. Its environmental protection agency
never even made a final determination regarding the mining license’s EIA.
This allows Pacific Rim to frame its complaint not against El Salvador’s
environmental regulations of mining projects per se but rather against El
Salvador’s inconsistent and unexpected implementation of its own
environmental regime.534 Unfortunately, during the arbitration process, El
Salvador’s weak environmental regime is likely to be on trial rather than the
merits of the country’s environmental objections to the mine.535
Because Costa Rica’s case is distinguishable from El Salvador’s, Costa
Rica may be in a better legal situation. In Costa Rica, documented
environmental violations substantiated the domestic judicial shutdown of the
Crucitas mine.536 As explained in Part III.B.2.c below, a nation that follows
531. Id.
532. Damien Kingsbury, Australian Mining is Poisoning El Salvador. It Could Soon Send It
Broke,
Too,
G UARDIAN
(Oct.
2,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/03/australian-mining-is-poisoning-el-salvador-itcould-soon-send-it-broke-too.
533. Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the Environment
Through International Investment Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT ’L L. R EV . 383, 411 (2015) (“Some awards
suggest that tribunals prefer deferring to the State’s scientific findings and their analysis focuses on the
scientific process that regulators follow. In other cases, tribunals have opted to evaluate the soundness of
the scientific findings.”).
534. See Waelde & Kolo, supra note 511, at 819 (arguing that investors complain not about a
highly regulated environmental regime that is applied evenly and consistently but about unpredictable
shifts in implementation).
535. Subjecting developing nations to investor liability based on their weaknesses or corruption
is another significant flaw of the international investor legal regime. Investors rely on these weaknesses
to their economic advantage in ways that harm the people of nations with weak democracies. This Article
does not attempt to resolve this flaw; rather, it merely makes recommendations for Guatemala to comply
with its obligations to protect the environment.
536. Court Shuts Down Crucitas Gold Mine, Citing Environmental Harm, INTER-AM. ASS’N FOR
ENVTL.
DEF.,
http://www.aida-americas.org/our-work/freshwater-preservation/court-shuts-downcrucitas-gold-mine-citing-environmental-harm (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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due process to implement its domestic environmental regime in a nondiscriminatory fashion should not face liability for its decision. The
retroactive surface mining ban could result in liability for Costa Rica. The
mining company could assert unfairness arising from a change in the
country’s legal regime that invalidated their reliance on the existing law at
the time of the investment. Yet Costa Rica is not necessarily bound to a fixed
environmental regime if it can establish changed circumstances and new
information that merit a different approach.537 In such cases, the arbitration
tribunal is likely to consider the investor’s reasonable expectations, including
whether the reforms in the law constituted a reasonable foreseeable risk.538
c. Defending Against International Arbitration Liability
Across the globe, governments are asserting domestic environmental
regimes to stall or stop development projects involving foreign investors.539
In turn, this trend has fueled a new generation of complaints in arbitration
tribunals like the complaints against Costa Rica and El Salvador.540 This Part
examines how Guatemala can best defend itself against a claim of
expropriation were the country to shut down a current mining project.541
Guatemala would likely defend itself against an expropriation claim
based on shutting down a currently-operating mine by claiming that either
the company’s exploitation license was never valid because the company
537. See, e.g., Anna Cederstav, Costa Rica Bans Open-Pit Metal Mining, EARTHJUSTICE (Nov.
23, 2010), http://earthjustice.org/blog/2010-november/costa-rica-bans-open-pit-metal-mining (explaining
that the Costa Rican government banned open pit mining in 2010).
538. See, e.g., Jill Replogle, Canadian Mining Company Reorganizes to Seek Damages from
Costa Rica, TICO TIMES, http://www.ticotimes.net/2016/01/21/canadian-mining-company-reorganizesseek-damages-costa-rica (last visited May 16, 2016) (outlining the arbitration claims by a Canadian
mining company against Costa Rica).
539. See, e.g., Cederstav, supra note 538 (explaining that the Costa Rican government banned
open-pit mining in 2010).
540. See Waelde & Kolo, supra note 511, at 838–39 (documenting arbitration complaints based
on denial of permits to operate landfills, prohibiting the manufacture of toxic chemicals, refusing to grant
a license for water extraction, disallowing mining activities, tackling claims of environmental harms from
oil extraction, and halting tourist development projects in ecologically-sensitive locations). See also
Rahim Mollo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liability Under
Investment Treaties, 29 B ERKELEY J. I NT ’L L. 1, 2 (2011).
541. There are also a number of procedural and technical defenses that Guatemala could raise
against expropriation claims. These include, for example, lack of jurisdiction under CAFTA-DR. For
example, El Salvador successfully defended against another mining claim, this time by Commerce Group
Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc., American mining companies, because those companies did not
comply with CAFTA-DR’s waiver provision and therefore ICSID did not have jurisdiction over the
complaint. Commerce Group Corp et al. v. The Republic of El Salvador, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/17 (Mar.14, 2011). An analysis of these types of defenses is beyond the scope of this Article.
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failed to secure an EIA, or by claiming that it revoked the exploitation license
because the company violated Article 51 of the Mining Law.542 Ideally, the
EIA guarantees that the project will not contaminate the environment and
will ensure ecological equilibrium.543 Article 51 of the Mining Law governs
the causes for suspension of mining operations, which include “when risks
or imminent danger to the life of persons or property” exist.544 The primary
purpose of both the EIA requirement and Article 51 is to protect the
environment or prevent danger to human, animal, or plant life or health—a
purpose that falls squarely within the environmental requirements of
investment treaties, including the CAFTA-DR.545 Thus, if Guatemala follows
both the substantive and procedural requirements of the EIA requirement and
of Article 51 respectively, Guatemala should have a strong defense against
investors’ expropriation claims. In fact, some scholars have even suggested
that an investment made in violation of a host state’s environmental
regulation falls outside the protection of CAFTA-DR, depending on the
nature and gravity of the violation.546 This argument, however, remains
largely untested.
Guatemala’s more likely defense, therefore, is that the ban is legitimate
and proportionate to the need asserted—that is to say, necessary to achieve a
public purpose.547 Guatemala will also want to assert that the measure does
not merit compensation because it constitutes a legitimate exercise of
preexisting regulatory norms that bind investors.548 Important precedents in
comparative domestic legal systems limit expropriation claims by a state’s
application of preexisting regulatory requirements, so long as the state
notified companies and followed due process.549 Until recently, this
regulatory-takings exemption to expropriation had not been part of the
international investment regime.550 International investment law does not
542. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51.
543. MARN GOVERNMENTAL DECREE, supra note 243, at pmbl.
544. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51(a).
545. Id.
546. Beharry & Kuritzky, supra note 534, at 397.
547. Id. For a discussion of the necessity/proportionality standard, see also Waelde & Kolo, supra
note 511, at 827–35; Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International
Investment Law, 36 U. P A . J. INT ’ L L. 1, 36, 47–50 (2014).
548. Mollo & Jacinto, supra note 541, at 16.
549. See generally Rachelle Alterman, The U.S. Regulatory Takings Debate Through an
International Lens, 42/43 URB. L. 331 (2011) (providing a comparative analysis of regulatory takings
jurisprudence in several countries); Harvey M. Jacobs, An Alternate Perspective on United StatesEuropean Property Rights and Land Use Planning: Differences Without Any Substance, 61 P LANNING
& ENVTL . L. 3, 3–4 (2009).
550. See Matthew C. Porterfield, International Expropriation Rules and Federalism, 23 S TAN .
ENVTL . L.J. 3, 35–62 (2004) (providing a history of expropriation provisions).
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prohibit all expropriations per se; rather, it draws no distinction between
compensable takings (i.e., those that lack a legitimate public purpose) and
non-compensable regulatory measures (i.e., those that serve a legitimate
public purpose).551
Fortunately, this legal landscape is changing as investment and trade
agreements incorporate provisions that explicitly recognize the need to
balance the individual rights of investors with the regulatory needs of
societies to protect health and the environment.552 Indeed, some of these trade
agreements, like CAFTA-DR, have limited expropriation claims arising from
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions that protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as safeguarding the environment.553 In negotiating CAFTADR, the participating countries proactively addressed dangers posed by an
overly broad definition of expropriation by including an Annex imposing
certain limitations on arbitral tribunals’ discretion in construing
expropriation provisions too broadly.554 Specifically, the Annex establishes
a presumption that “nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
[intended] to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as . . . the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”555 Only in “rare
circumstances” is this presumption rebuttable.556
For Guatemala to assert this type of regulatory exemption (i.e., a noncompensable taking), it needs to be able to officially document the
environmental and social harms that justify the measure.557 This will require
sound scientific evidence.558 Admittedly, under the existing status quo, this

551. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 H ARV . I NT ’L L.J. 229, 264 (2015) (“Tribunals
that have introduced standards of review like ‘proportionality’ and ‘the margin of appreciation’ have
varied wildly . . . .”); see also Mildred E. Warner, Regulatory Takings and Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for Planners, 41 URB. L. 427, 427–28 (2009).
552. See Arato, supra note 552, at 263–64. See also Wagner, supra note 548, at 36, 67–85; Mollo
& Jacinto, supra note 541, at 17–24; Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context:
Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 101 AM. J. INT ’ L L. 475 (2008) (explaining how
international institutions and actors influence the future of regulatory takings); Marc R. Poirier, The
NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Though the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL . L. 851,
852–55 (2003) (examining the global transformation in regulatory takings and the implications for future
proceedings).
553. Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental Protection in InvestorState Dispute Settlement under CAFTA: Lessons from the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. DAVIS B US .
L.J. 103, 112–16 (2007) (comparing CAFTA expropriation reforms to the broader definition that exists
under NAFTA).
554. Id. at 116.
555. CAFTA-DR, supra note 504, at Annex 10-C(4)(b).
556. Id.
557. Mollo & Jacinto, supra note 541, at 25.
558. Id. at 25–32.
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would be difficult to provide. Like El Salvador, Guatemala is also vulnerable
to having its weak institutional practices—approving mining projects and
EIAs despite significant evidence of environmental and social harms—
weaken the legitimacy of any decision to close a mine. This, however, does
not preclude Guatemala from starting to take its job of environmental
regulation seriously. Existing laws may be weak but they do impose
standards that, if seriously implemented, could yield substantial good faith
and a legitimate record with which to substantiate any closure decision’s
legal justification. This would take time and resources, but it is not
impossible. The 2015 EIA regulations are better already and could be the
basis for significantly improving the work of MARN when considering new
applications for exploitation licenses.
For already-approved mines, Guatemala may still apply Article 51 of the
Mining Law to account for new information on adverse impacts to
Guatemala’s environment. Some information may not have been known prior
to the mine’s exploitation, and thus would not have been reflected in the
company’s EIA.559 Guatemala may rely on the deficiencies of the mining
company’s EIA or it may rely on changed environmental expectations,
resulting from new information, in order to call for a revised regulatory
response.560 However, to do this well, Guatemala must follow the domestic
procedures established by law and not act in abrupt, unexpected ways.561
Guatemalan civil society must persist in filing domestic proceedings to
pursue an Article 51 remedy.562 Further, Guatemala must cease conducting
delayed and sham proceedings to stall or deny these claims. This is especially
important because Guatemala would have to assert that it acted in accordance
with due process.563 Article 51 calls for administrative proceedings that are
subject to judicial review.564 This process requires due diligence to shut down

559. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51.
560. Waelde & Kolo, supra note 511, at 824.
561. Id.; see also Wagner, supra note 548, at 50 (discussing the standard of legitimate investmentbacked expectation that accounts for changes in the regulatory structure so long as these changes are
foreseeable).
562. Guatemalan civil society should also consider utilizing CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 17 more in
these mining cases, although it must do so only after exhausting local remedies. The Secretariat on
Environmental Affairs can provide both political pressure and eventually a scientific record that could
strengthen not only Guatemala’s domestic process but also any expropriation claim filed in an arbitration
tribunal were Guatemala to shut down a mine. To date, this mechanism has been underutilized. Not a
single mining dispute in Guatemala has been submitted. See Registro Público, SECRETARÍA DE ASUNTOS
AMBIENTALES http://www.saa-sem.org/registro (last visited May 16, 2016).
563. Id.
564. Mining Law, supra note 64, at art. 51.
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existing mining projects that represent an imminent threat to life, property,
and the environment.
To determine if a regulation constitutes a disguised protectionist
measure that discriminates against foreign investment, a tribunal is likely to
examine the motive behind Guatemala’s mine closure. Guatemala could not,
for example, simply take over the mine or sell it to another company without
addressing the environmental concerns that led to the mine’s seizure in the
first place.565 The regulatory measures would need to be applied evenly to all
metal mining projects and any exemptions would need to be substantiated
based on sound scientific evidence.
Even if Guatemala takes all of these measures, an arbitration tribunal
may still determine that the environmental regulations constitute an indirect
expropriation and could mandate compensation to mining companies.566
Damages, however, should be more limited than what mining companies
currently claim. For example, mining companies should only recover what
they have invested to explore the presence of minerals in the country.
Damages should not be based on speculative expected profits from
exploitation.567 For exploitation licenses, a mining company’s claim to future
profits should be reduced by the cost of preexisting environmental
obligations.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after the resignation of former President Otto Pérez Molina on
September 3, 2015, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala issued two
important environmentally-friendly decisions involving the El Escobal mine
in San Rafael, Las Flores. The first decision recognized the fundamental
human right to water, which requires MARN to closely monitor the effect of
the El Escobal mine on the availability and quality of water.568 Presumably,
MARN would close the mine if its operation infringes on the human right to
consumption of water.569 The second decision affirmed that MEM violated
565. See Beharry & Kuritzky, supra note 534, at 397 (explaining jurisdiction of investment treaty
settlement mechanisms). See also Waelde & Kolo, supra note 511, at 835–37 (discussing how courts
disfavor discriminatory regulations aimed at foreign investors).
566. See generally Wang, supra note 508, at 259–63 (discussing indirect expropriation claims in
the context of CAFTA-DR and NAFTA).
567. See Porterfield, supra note 551, at 5–6 (noting that international arbitral tribunals have a
broader interpretation of what constitutes an expropriation compared to the American concept of
regulatory takings).
568. See supra notes 303–09 and accompanying text.
569. See supra notes 301–09 and accompanying text.
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due process rights by denying a hearing to hundreds of individuals who filed
environmental opposition claims against the mining concession.570 This
second ruling rolled back the entire administrative process to the date of the
original opposition filings prior to the mining license concession, and ordered
MEM to grant a hearing with regard to the opposition’s filings. Presumably,
this voids the mining concession, at least according to an interpretation held
by CALAS—which filed the claim—and many other environmental groups.
But that interpretation is contested in the Guatemalan media.571
There is uncertainty in either case whether the rulings will lead to a
closure of the mine, but it is the closest Guatemala has come to shutting down
a mining project based on environmental concerns. Tahoe Resources, the
company that owns El Escobal, claims that it is the third largest mine in the
world with a deposit of silver, lead, zinc, and gold valued in the billions.572
Tahoe Resources has also invested millions in the two years the mine has
operated.573 Were the mine to be shut down based on these rulings,
Guatemala would likely face an international arbitration claim in the millions
of dollars. If this happened, the institutional environmental weaknesses that
were the basis for the judicial challenges in Guatemalan courts could
compromise Guatemala’s defense.
This does not mean that the environmental concerns lack merit. Ample
evidence documents the significant environmental, health, and other social
harms resulting from mining in the country.574 In June 2015, we visited the
El Escobal mine and heard directly from more than 30 residents of several
communities around the mine about the depletion and contamination of water
sources.575 But it is not too late for Guatemalan environmental institutions to
remedy their weak track record of documenting mining’s environmental
harms. The Constitutional Court gave MARN not just a mandate, but an
opportunity to build a record of how the El Escobal mine is affecting water
in the region. When we visited MARN, our sense was that the agencyat
least under the interim leadershipwanted a larger role to define the
environmental impacts from mining, but it lacked the resources and the
570. Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Expediente Número 4617-2013.
571. See, e.g., Joel Suncar & Byron Vásquez, CC Ordena Revisar Oposición a Mina Escobal,
PRENSA LIBRE (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/comunitario/cc-ordena-cierre-demina-el-escobal.
572. Cf. Escobal Mine, TAHOE RESOURCES, http://www.tahoeresources.com/operations/escobalmine/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
573. Id.
574. See supra Part II.B.
575. Aldana Co-Organized LatCrit Study Space Project in Guatemala, MCGEORGE SCH. L. (July
15,
2015),
http://mcgeorge.edu/News/Aldana_CoOrganized_LatCrit_Study_Space_Project_in_Guatemala.htm.
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political space to act. MARN now has the backing of Guatemala’s highest
court and civil society. And it should act, not only for the sake of the residents
near the El Escobal mine, but also for the State, to avoid the risk of putting
MARN’s institutional weakness on trial before an international arbitration
tribunal.

